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IN THE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ALLEN BRUNN

& JAMES DIDERICKSON,

Defendant/Appellmz t.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendants Allan Bruun and James Diderickson appeal convictions
for twelve counts of theft (six second degree felonies, five third degree
felonies, and one class A misdemeanor), and one count of engaging in a
pattern of unlawful activity (a second degree felony).

This Court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp.
2012).

INTRODUCTION
Defendants ,,vere majority shareholders in Tivoli Properties, an LLC
that was formed to develop 29 acres of land in Saratoga Springs. Several
1nonths after Tivoli was formed, its other shareholders learned that

Defendants had written checks for almost $200,000 out of Tivoli funds and
used those funds to support their other cornpanies and projects. A jury later

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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convicted Defendants of twelve counts of theft and one count of engaging in
a pattern of unlawful activity.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: Did the Utah LLC Act allow Defendants to unilaterally
disregard limitations on their spending authority that were set forth in
Tivoli' s Operating Agreement?

Issue II: Did the court err by allowing the jury to detennine whether
Defendants were authorized to write the checks?

Issue III: Did the court err by refusing to reduce the value of each theft
conviction by the amount of Defendants' alleged ownership interest in
Tivoli?

Standard

~f Review for Issues I-III:

These statutory interpretation

questions are reviewed for correcl11ess. State v. Binkerd, 2013 UT App 216,
,I21, 310 P.3d 755.

Issue 1V: Did Defendants receive ineffective assistance when their trial
counsel withdrew a request for a lesser included offense inslTuction on
wrongful appropriation?
[ssue V:

Did Defendants receive ineffective assistance when their

counsel did not request an additional jury instruction to define one of the
elen1ents of a pattern of unlavvful conduct?
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Standard of Review for Issues IV-V: Ineffective assistance clailns raised
for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Bryant,
2012 UT App 264, illO, 290 P.3d 33.

Issue VI: Did the court err by not reducing the restitution order based
on the value the victilns received in a prior civil settlement?

Standard of Review: This statutory interpretation question is reviewed
for correctness. Binkerd, 2013 UT App 216, ~21.

Issue VII: Should this Court reverse for cumulative error?
Standard of Review: This Court reverses for cumulative error "on.l y if
the cumulative effect of the several errors" undermines confidence that a
"fair h·ial was had." State v. Srmtonio, 2011 UT App 385, ,i30, 265 P.3d 822.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are reproduced in Addendum A:
~

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2009);

11

Utah Code Am1. § 48-2c-803-804 (\Vest 2009);

I!>

Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-701 ('Nest 2009).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Tivoli LLC is formed to develop 29 acres in Saratoga Springs
In 1989, Kerry and Bobbie Posey bought 42 acres of land in Saratoga
Springs. R1554:114. They sold off 13 acres over the years, but kept the
remaining 29 acres, hoping to eventually sell them at a high enough price to
fund their retirements. R1521:128-29, 141; 1554:114-15.
In early 2007, the Poseys were introduced to Defendants, who worked
together developing real estate projects. R1521:131-32, 136. In August 2007,
the Poseys and Defendants worked out a two-step deal by which they
would jointly develop the Poseys' 29 acres. First, the Poseys agreed to sell
the 29 acres to Equity Partners ("Equity"), an LLC that was owned by
Defendants. R1521:139; 1554:128; 1535:213-14; see also State's Exh. 1 (Real
Estate Purchase Contract) ("the REPC") (Addendum B). Second, the Poseys
and Defendants formed Tivoli Properties, an LLC that was created to
develop the 29 acres.

R1521:140; see also State's Exh. 2 ("the Operating

Agreement" or "Op.Agr.") (Addendmn C).
1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
Slate v. Bravo, 2015 UT App 17, ,I2 n.1, 343 P.3d 306.
Defendants were tried together. To avoid duplication, the State will
cite to Diderickson: s h·ial record. Also, Defendants filed separate briefs that
are paginated slightly differently. But their briefs are substantively identicat
raising the same arguments and issues in the same order and relying on the
sa1ne authority. To avoid duplication, the State will respond to the
pagination from Diderickson's brief and cite to it as" Aplt. Br."
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•

Under the Operating Agreen1ent, Equity initially owned 75% of the
shares in Tivoli, while the Poseys owned 25%.

Op.Agr. at 3.3.

The

understanding was that the Poseys were putting up the property, while
Defendants would use their expertise to develop it. R1521:156.
The initial question was how to fund the development. The answer
ca1ne in the form of another h·ansaction.

In the original REPC, Equity

agreed to pay $3.5 million to the Poseys for the property, including $750,000
up front. REPC at *1; R1521:141-42. But when Defendants told the Poseys
that they couldn't come up with the money, the Poseys agreed that
Defendants would put the property up for a collateral loan and allow its
proceeds to be used to fund Tivoli's initial development. R1521:142-43.
On November 16, 2007, Defendants secured a short-term, highinterest loan for $750,000 from K.E. Capital. R1521:143 147, 195; REPC, add.
5 at line 202. That loan was secured using the 29 acres as collateral.
R1534:20.

Approximately $350,000 was used to pay off pre-existing mortgages
and taxes; the remaining money

\Vas

put into Tivoli' s bank account.

R1520:47; 1534:16; 1554:145; REPC, Add. 5 at lines 506-08. This money was

Tivoli's only money. R1534:131, 313-14; 1554:154.
~

It was "exclusively"

intended to get Tivoli through the "entitlement" process- the process by

-:J-
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which a municipality approves a future development.

R1521:144, 147;

1534:69-70. The idea was that after entitlement was completed, Tivoli would
be able to secure a consh·uction loan at better terms allowing it to actually
build on the property.

R1521:147.

Defendants told the Poseys that

entitle1nent would cost "around a hundred thousand dollars." R1554:139;
1521:153-54.
Poseys discover that Defendants used
Tivoli' s money for their own purposes
The Poseys also worked out an arrangement with Defendants in
which they received weekly distributions from Tivoli' s funds. R1554:14849; REPC, Add. 4. In May 2008, however, Diderickson told the Poseys that
there was not enough money left in the Tivoli account to pay the
dish·ibutions.

R1554:165-66.

When Bobbie asked where the 1noney had

gone, Diderickson "evaded" her question. R1554:166; 1521:167-68.
Concerned, the Posevs accessed Tivoli' s bank account and discovered
.I

that it was down to just $1083. R1554:167-68. When they reviewed the
check history, they were "floored" to learn that Defendants had spent
several hundred thousand dollars on expenses that appeared unrelated to
the development of the 29 acres. Rl554:169, 171; 1521:168. These included a

nu111ber of checks that Defendants had written to themselves or their other
con1.panies-including one for $100,000-as ·well checks that covered
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expenses on Defendants' other real estate projects.

See R69-78 (listing

checks); State's Exh. 4 (copies of each check) (Addendum D)
Civil settlement

In the meantime, payment on the K.E. Capital loan was coming due,
creating the risk that K.E. Capital would foreclose on the property.
R1521:249-50.

The risk of foreclosure was so hnminent that Diderickson

asked the Poseys to sign off on another $100,000 loan that would buy Tivoli
an exh·a two weeks. R1521:181-82. Bobbie refused to sign. R1521:183-87.
Instead, she filed a notice of default, intending to get title to the property
back from Equity so that the Poseys could negotiate with K.E. Capital
directly. R1554:178; 1521:250.
On November 11, 2008, the Poseys entered a settlement agree1nent
,-vith Equity.

Defendants' Exh. 2 ("the civil settlen1ent") (Addendum. E).

Under its tenns, the Poseys paid $25,000 to Equity in exchange for title to
the 29 acres. Id. at *1-2. The Poseys also agreed to release Defendants fron1
all claims relating to their manage1nent of Tivoli. Id. at ~--2.
Defendants are ordered to pay restitution

On May 9, 2011, Defendants ,vere charged with 29 criminal counts.
Rl-12; see also R69-78 (amended information).

-7-
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Theft: Counts 1-28 were theft charges. Under Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-6-404 (West 2009), a "person cmnmits theft if he obtains or exercises

unauthorized conh·ol over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof." Each of the theft counts was tied to a check that the
State alleged Defendants wrote from Tivoli' s account for an unauthorized
purpose. R69-78.
UPUAA: Count 29 charged Defendants with violating the Utah

Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act (UPUAA) by committing at least three
thefts. R69-78.
Defendants were h·ied from November 4-15, 2013. Midway through
h·ial, the State dismissed hvo of the theft counts. R1536:207-08.
As for the remaining counts, Defendants never disputed that they
wrote the checks or that the funds came fr01n Tivoli' s account.

Instead,

Defendants claimed that they were authorized to write these checks under
both the Opera ting Agreen1ent and the parties' course of dealings.

See

R155L1:92-93, 96-111; 1535:265-71; 1538:36-53, 63-93.

The jury convicted Defendants of twelve theft counts and the UPUAA
count, but it acquitted Defendants of the remaining theft counts. R967-70.
By virtue of the convictions, the jury found that Defendants con11nitted theft
by using Tivoli funds without authorization for:
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•

Expenses associated ,,vith Defendants' other real estate develop1nent
projects (counts 2, 3, 4, 15, 19, 24); and

~

Cash advances to Defendants' other companies (counts 5, 7, 8, 21, 22,
and 28).

R69-78; 967-70.

At sentencing, the court ordered Defendants to serve a year in jail and
pay restitution. R1099-1102. Defendants subsequently moved to vacate or
modify the restitution order, arguing that (1) restitution was foreclosed by
the civil settlement, and (2) that if restitution was ordered, it should be
reduced to reflect the Poseys' lhnited ownership interest in Tivoli. R1O7179, 1348-53.

The court rejected these arguments and ordered Defendants to pay
$189,574 in restitution- an amount equal to the face value of the hvelve

checks for which Defendants were convicted. Rl373-75; 1539:22-25.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendants argue that because they owned 75% of Tivoli, the
Utah LLC Act gave them authority to unilaterally disregard any limitations
on their spending authority set forth in the Operating Agreement.

This

claim is unpreserved, so Defendants allege plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel.

-9-
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Both claims fail for the same reason-na1nely, the LLC Act did not
allow Defendants to disregard Tivoli' s Operating Agreement. Instead, the
very provisions in the LLC Act that Defendants rely on state that any
lin1itations imposed in an operating agreement conh·ol. Here, the Operating
Agreement expressly limited Defendants' spending authority. Because of
this, the LLC Act provided no basis for relief.
Point II: Defendants argue that the court erred by allowing the jury
to determine whether they were authorized to write the checks. According
to Defendants, the court should have decided the question as a 1natter of
law.
The court did not err.

It is settled that if a contract's terms are

ambiguous, its interpretation becomes a question of fact.

Here, the

Operating Agrcen1ent was ainbiguous as to (i) Tivoli' s business purpose, (ii)
whether Defendants were Tivoli' s managers, and (iii) whether Defendants
had authority to write these checks. Because of the ainbiguity, the court
proper! y submitted the case to the jury.

If the court erred, the error was harmless because the jury decided the
question correctly. The Operating Agreement contained several lin1itations
that prohibited Defendants from writing these checks for these purposes.
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Thus, even if the court should have decided the question as a matter of law,
Defendants were not harmed because the jury's decision was correct.
Point III: Defendants argue that the court should have reduced the

value of each theft conviction by their ownership interest in Tivoli.
Defendants then argue that if this had occurred, all but four of the
convictions would have been barred by the statute of limitations.
Contrary to their claim, Defendants had no personal ownership
interest in Tivoli' s money. Rather, they only had an ownership interest in
Tivoli itself.

Because of this, they were not authorized to take Tivoli' s

money for their own use and they were properly convicted of theft for the
full value of each check.
Point IV: Defendants argue that their counsel was ineffective for

withdra,ving a request for a lesser included offense instruction on wrongful
appropriation.
Defendants have not proven deficient performance because counsel
had a clear sh·ategic reason for withdrawing the request- this advanced an

"all or nothing approach" that was designed to maximize their prospects for
acquittal.
Defendants also have not proven prejudice. Defendants could only
have been convicted of vnongful appropriation if the jury found that they
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intended to temporarily steal Tivoli' s funds. But Defendants never claimed
that they intended to temporarily steal Tivoli' s funds; rather, they claimed
that they never stole any funds at all.

Thus, there is not a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had been
given this instruction.

Point V: Defendants argue that their counsel was ineffective for not
requesting an additional jury instruction that would have further defined
one of the elements of the UPUAA charge.
Counsel did not perform deficiently, however, because there was no
settled law that entitled Defendants to the additional insh·uction. Moreover,
counsel could have reasonably determined that requesting this instruction
vvould open the door to potentially incritninatory inforn1ation.
Defendants also were not prejudiced. If counsel had requested and
received this instruction, the instruction could only have impacted one of
the two variants by which the State could prove a UPUAA violation. But it
would have left the other variant untouched, and the State had sh~ong
evidence to support conviction under that variant.

Given this, it is not

reasonably likely that the outcome would have been more favorable if this
instruction were given.
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Point VI: Defendants argue that the court erred should have offset

the restitution order to reflect the value they gave the Poseys in the civil
settlen1ent. Defendants never requested such an offset below, however, so
the claim is unpreserved. Because Defendants do not invoke a preservation
exception, the issue should not be reached.
Point VII:

Defendants ask for reversal for cumulative error.

But

because there was no prejudicial error, this request should be denied.

ARGUMENT
I.
The Utah LLC Act did not allow Defendants to disregard
Tivoli' s Operating Agreement.

The question at h·ial was whether Defendants were authorized to
write the disputed checks. As discussed in more detail below, one of the
central issues was whether limitations

jn

the Operating Agreement 1neant

that Defendants were not authorized to write these checks.
On appeal, Defendants argue for the first time that they were not
bound by the Operating Agreement. According to Defendants, the Utah
LLC Act gave them authority to unilaterally authorize these checks, even if
the checks were in direct "contravention to the operating agreement." Aplt.
Br. 23-25.

-1 :~-
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This claim is unpreserved, however, and no preservation exception
applies because the Utah LLC Act did not grant Defendants this authority.

A. This claim is unpreserved.
"As a general rule, clailns not raised before the district court 1nay not
be raised on appeal." Oseguera v. State, 2014 UT 31, ,IlO, 332 P.3d 963. To
preserve a claim for appellate review, a litigant must present it "to the
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule" on it.

Id.

A party does not do this "by merely mentioning an issue without

analyzing

supporting

evidence

or

relevant

legal

authority."

Id.

"Additionally, a party that makes an objection based on one ground does
not preserve any alternative grounds for objection for appeal." Id.
Defendants admit that they "did not specifically request the court to
interpret the LLC Act," but contend that this argument was "similar" to the
their request for the court to conclude that they had authority under the
Operating Agreement to write these checks. Aplt. Br. 2.
But asking the court to interpret their rights under the Operating
Agreement is a far cry from asking the Court to determine that, by virtue of
an unmentioned statute, Defendants could actually disregard the Operating
Agreement entirely. Defendants did the former; they did not do the latter.
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This claim is thus unpreserved and Defendants can obtain relief only
if they demonstrate that a preservation exception applies. Oseguera, 2014
UT 31, ~15. Here, Defendants argue that (1) the court plainly erred in not
sua sponte recognizing their alleged rights under the LLC Act, and (2) trial
counsel was ineffective for not invoking that act. Both claims fail.

B. Defendants have not established that the court obviously
erred by not ruling that they had authority to disregard the
Operating Agreement.
Defendants first assert that the court com1nitted plain error by not sua
sponte recognizing their alleged rights under the LLC Act. Aplt. Br. 34-35.
To prove plain error, Defendants must prove "that the h·ial court committed
an error, that the error '"'as obvious, and that the error was prejudicial."

State v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ,I49, 342 P.3d 738.
The problem with Defendants' argun1ent is that they had no such
statutory right. Thus, there was no error, let alone plain error.
Defendants first rely on Utah Code Annotated § 48-2c-804 (West
2009), \vhich governs manager-managed LLC's like Tivoli. Aplt. Br.23-25;

see nlso Op.Agr. at 7.1-7.9 (suggesting that Tivoli ,vas a manager-managed
LLC).

They specifically rely on § 48-2c-804(6), vvhich states that

II

unless

otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreen1ent of
the company," members and managers ·who hold "2/3 of the profits

-JS-
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II

interests in the company" can exercise the powers described in Subsection
48-2c-803(3)."

Those powers include the power to make

II

a substantial

change in the business purpose of the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c803(3)(d) (West 2009).
Defendants contend that, because they owned two-thirds of the
profits interest in Tivoli, it should have been obvious to the trial court that
they had power to unilaterally change Tivoli' s business purpose and
unilaterally authorize these checks. Aplt. Br. 23-25.
Defendants are misreading the LLC Act. Conh·ary to their claim., the
LLC Act does not allow 1nanagers - even those holding two-thirds of the
shares in an LLC- to disregard the operating agreement. Instead, the very
statute Defendants rely on begins with the qualifier that the statutory
authority exists "unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or
operating agreement of the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-804(6). This
limitation is cenh·al to the LLC Act, which contains a legislative directive to
"give the maximum effect" "to the enforceability of operating agreements of
con1panies." Utah Code Arn1. § 48-2c-1901 (\Nest 2009); accord OLP, LLC v.

Burninghmn, 2008 UT App 173, i[18, 185 P.3d 1.138 (LLC Act controls unless
there is "conh·ary language in [the] operating agreement").
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Here, Defendants initially claim that they could unilaterally change
Tivoli' s business purpose. But the Operating Agreement defined Tivoli' s
business purpose. Op.Agr. at 2.4. And, notably, it then expressly required
the "consent of One Hundred percent (100%) of all Membership Interests"
for "[a]ny amendment or restatement" of "the Operating Agreement" or
"[a]ny change in the character of the business and affairs of the Com.pany."
Op.Agr. at 7.5.5; 7.5.7. Thus, without the Poseys' consent, Defendants had
no authority to change Tivoli' s business purpose.

Notably, the Poseys

testified at trial that they never gave such consent.

R1554:142, 144, 163;

?

1520:33-34; 1521:151, 162. Defendants also rely on Utah Code Annotated § 48-2c-803(3)(a)(i),
which allm,vs members who hold two-thirds of the profits interest in an LLC
to authorize a person "to do any act on behalf of the company that is not in
the ordinary course of the company's business, or business of the kind

2

As discussed below in Point II(B)(1), if the Operating Agree1nent is
read as a whole, it was arguably ambiguous as to the full scope of Tivoli' s
business purpose. But this does not change the result with respect to
Defendants' claim that they could unilaterally change that purpose. Again,
the LLC Act expressly defers to any limitations in an operating agreement,
and this Operating Agrcernent stated that TivoU's business purpose
(whatever, exactly, it was) could not be changed without approval of
1nen1bers holding 100% of the membership interests. As noted, Defendants
never received approval, and they accordingly had no such authority under
the LLC Act.

-·17_
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carried on by the company." Aplt. Br. 24. They claim that, because of their
ownership interest, this also gave the111 power to unilaterally authorize
these checks. Id.
But again, Utah Code Annotated§ 48-2c-804(6) states that this power
can be limited by an LLC's operating agreement. And here, the Operating
Agreement requires approval of 100% of the membership interests for
" [a ]ny significant and material purchase" of "any real or personal property
or business," as well as for the "com1nission of any act which would make it
impossible for the Company to carry on its ordinary business and affairs."
Op.Agr. at 7.5.1; 7.5.8.
As discussed,

Defendants were convicted of writing

twelve

unauthorized checks that, together, took $189,000 out of Tivoli' s account.
As also discussed, Tivoli ran out of n1oney before the 29 acres were
developed, thus threatening foreclosure of the very property that it vvas
formed to develop. Because of this, it could not have been "obvious" to the
trial court that the LLC Act authorized Defendants to write those checks,
given that these expenses at least arguably (1) qualified as "significant and
material purchases," and (2) made it impossible for Tivoli to continue
functioning.
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Finally, Defendants' plain error argument also fails because it would
not have been obvious on this record that they even had the necessary
profits interest to assert the claimed authority. As noted, Defendants rely
on portions of the LLC Act that depend on their ownership interest in
Tivoli, and to establish their ownership interest, they point to the shares
allocation set forth in the Operating Agreement. Aplt. Br. 24.
But for purposes of the LLC Act, a member's profits interest is
determined by his "capital account balances on the date on which
compliance is measured." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-803.1 (West 2009); see

also Op.Agr. at 3.7 (directing that capital accounts would be maintained to
reflect members' current shares). Thus, although the Operating Agreement
set forth the "Membership Interests of the initial members," it stated that
"[c]hanges in Membership Interests after the date of this Agreement" would
"be reflected in the Company's records/' and the "allocation of Membership
Interests reflected in the Company's records from time to time" would be
·'presumed to be correct" for purposes of both the agreement and rights
under the LLC Act. Op.Agr. at 1.2.12 (emphasis added).
Here, Defendants provided no proof of what the separate capital
account balances were on each of the "date[s] on which compliance is
n1easured" (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2c-803.1 )-i.e., the separate dates on which

-19-
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they allegedly authorized each check. Without such specific proof, it could
not have been obvious to the court that there was an evidentiary basis to
apply these provisions of the LLC Act. 3
C. Defendants have not proven that counsel performed
deficiently by not making a futile argument based on the LLC
Act.
Defendants' ineffective assistance claim fails for similar reasons. To
prove ineffective assistance, Defendants must prove that (1) their counsel
"rendered a demonstrably deficient performance that fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment" and (2) "that counsel's
perfonnance resulted in prejudice." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, 117. The "failure
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised
does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Binkerd, 2013 UT App 216,
,129 n.6, 310 P.3d 755.

As discussed, the Operating Agreement required consent from all the
1nen1bers for any change in Tivoli' s business purpose, significant material
purchases, or any act that would make it impossible for Tivoli to carry out
its purposes.

There was no proof in this record that Defendants ever

obtained such approval fron1 the Poseys.

Moreover, the LLC Act also

3

Defendants also assert that this issue should be reviewed for
n1anifest injustice. "Manifest injustice is synonymous" with plain error.
State v. Jimenez, 2012 UT 41, ~20, 284 P.3d 640. For the reasons set forth
above ,,vith respect to plain error, the manifest injustice claim fails.
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required proof from Tivoli' s capital accounts regarding Defendants'
ownership share on each date on ,,vhich they allegedly authorized each
check. There ,,vas no such proof. On this record, Defendants accordingly
have not proven that counsel performed deficiently by not making what
would have been a futile argument.
II.

The court properly submitted the theft counts to the jury.
Defendants next argue that the court erred when it allowed the jury to
decide whether they were authorized to write these checks. Aplt. Br. 25-32.
First, a note about what is- and is not-at issue in this claim. The
contested element in the theft counts was whether the checks were
"unauthorized." Utah Code Am,. § 76-6-404. There is no dispute that, if
Defendants had

'\!\7 anted,

they had a right to have the jury decide this

element. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (a defendant

has a cons ti tu tional right to have a jury "draw the ultimate conclusion of
guilt or innocence").
Here, however, Defendants claim that they had authority under the
Operating Agreement to vvrite these checks, and that because

the

interpretation of a contract is a question of la\·v, they had a right to have the
judge decide this question before trial. A plt. Br. 25-32. Thus, in contrast to
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the more usual scenario, Defendants here are claiming that they had a right
to have the jury not decide this element.
But Defendants' rights were not violated. It is settled that when a
conh·act is an1biguous, its interpretation presents a question of fact that may
be submitted to the jury.

Because this Operating Agreement was

ambiguous as to Defendants' authority, the court did not err by submitting
the case to the jury.
A. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of
law for the judge, while the interpretation of an ambiguous
contract is a question off act for the jury.

In "a jury h·ial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,"
while "questions of fact" are determined "by the jury." Utah Code Am"l. §
77-17-10(1) (West 2009). Thus, "juries serve only as fact-finders, not law-

1nakers or interpreters," and a court may determine '"pure questions of
law'" itself. State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, if ~10, 14, 220 P.3d 1198.
Defendants were charged with theft, which occurs when a person
"exercises unauthorized conh·ol" over another's property. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (West 2009).

Defendants argued belm,v that they had authority

under the Operating Agreement to write these checks. R1554:96; 1538:31-62,
63-93. Thus, the question of whether Defendants committed theft initially

turned on interpreting their authority under the Operating Agreement.
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"A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law,
determined by the words of the agreen1ent, or a question of fact, detern1.ined
by exh·insic evidence of intent." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ,I14,
48 P.3d 918. The difference turns on whether the contract is ambiguous.
"If the language within the four corners of the contract 1s

una1nbiguous, the parties' intentions are determmed from the plain
meaning of the contractual language, and the conh·act may be interpreted as
a matter of law." WebBank v. Am. Gen. AnnuihJ Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ,119,
54 P.3d 1139. "However, if the language of the contract is ambiguous such
that the intentions of the parties cannot be determined by the plain
language of the agreement, exh·insic evidence must be looked to in order to
detern1ine the intentions of the parties," and its interpretation becomes a
question of fact. Id.; accord R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d
1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). 4
Thus,

if

the

Operating

Agreement

was

unambiguous,

its

interpretation became a question of law; but if it was ambiguous, then the
question of whether Defendants had authority to ,-vrite these checks beca111e
Defendants point out that this Operating Agreement contained an
integration clause. Aplt. Br. 26-27. Even on an integrated contract, exh·insic
evidence may be admitted to prove the parties' intent as a factual rnatter if
the "language of the agreement is ambiguous." Tangren Family Trust v.
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, i[,rll, 18, 182 P.3d 326; accord ll\lebBnnk, 2002 UT 88,
.c1

~22.
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a question of fact that was properly submitted to the jury for consideration
alongside extrinsic evidence about the parties' intent. See also State v. Larsen,
834 P.2d 586, 591 (Utah App. 1992) (because defendant did not have clear
authority under partnership agreement to take partnership funds, "there
was a legal basis for finding 'unauthorized control,' and it was for the jury
to decide whether a theft was comn1itted"). 5
B. Because the Operating Agreement was ambiguous, the court
properly submitted the question of Defendants' authority to
the jury.

"An ambiguity exists in a conh·act tenn or provision if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
tern1s, 1nissing terms, or other facial deficiencies." WebBank, 2002 UT 88,
i120. Thus, a contract is a1nbiguous "when it is reasonably capable of being
understood in more than one sense" and the "conh·ary positions of the
parties" are each "tenable." R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1074.

5

The State accordingly notes one other question that is not at issue. If
the Operating Agreement unambiguously stated that these checks were not
authorized, that determination may also have presented a question of lavv
under the above authority. But because a defendant has a right to a jury h·ial
on all elements, the "judge 1nay not direct a verdict of guilty, in whole or in
part, no matter how conclusive the evidence.'' Charles Alan \t\Tright, et al., 2
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crirn § 371 (4th ed.). This Court need not resolve the
in1plications of such a scenario, however, because the State has never
clain1ed that the judge should have resolved this as a question of law in its
favor.
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As noted, the jury found that Defendants '"'ere not authorized to use
Tivoli funds for expenses associated with their other real estate projects or
companies. Thus, the question is whether reasonable minds could differ as
to whether the Agreement authorized such expenses.

Reasonable minds

could differ on three levels.

1. The agreement was ambiguous as to Tivoli' s business
purpose.
The Operating Agreement stated that Tivoli was formed "for the sole
purpose of investing in, purchasing, selling, granting, or taking an option on
lands for investment purposes and/ or development." Op.Agr. at Recitals,
#1. 6 That sa1ne provision directed that Tivoli "shall not conduct any other

business unless related to the business, unless approved by unanimous consent
of all Members." Id. (emphasis added).
At trial, Defendants argued that this provision gave them authority to
use Tivoli funds for any real estate project, regardless of whether it was tied
to the 29 acres. R226; 1554:96; 1520:32-34; 1535:129-30, 265, 268.
But the Operating Agreement also contained language restricting
Tivoli' s business purpose to those 29 acres.

The "Purposes of the

6

A recitals provjsion is the "preliminary statement in a conh·act ...
explaining the reasons for entering into it." Black's La,v Dictionary, Recital
(10th ed. 2014). This agreement does not contain a provision entitled
"Recitals." Instead, that inh·oductory section is captioned "\Nih1esseth."
For clarity, the State refers to it as the Recitals section.
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Company" subsection stated that Tivoli "is organized for the purpose of"
developing "the Property or any other enterprise that 1ne1nbers n1.ay
mutually agree upon." Op.Agr. at 2.4. In the Definitions section, the term
"Property" was defined as "approximately 29 acres of real property located
in Utah County, Utah" that was "the subject of the Purchase Agreement,"
and "Purchase Agreement" was defined to refer to the REPC under which
the Poseys sold the 29 acres to Equity. Op.Agr. at 1.2.16, 1.2.19. Given these
provisions, the State contended that the only authorized business purpose
was the development of the 29 acres. R1554:79-81.
Again, language is ambiguous if reasonable 1ninds could differ about
its interpretation. Here, Defendants' appellate approach at least implicitly
acknowledges that the State's interpretation of the business purpose clauses
was reasonable. Otherwise, there would be no need to open the brief by
arguing that the LLC Act gave Defendants authority to change Tivoli' s
business purpose.

Given this ambiguity, this question was properly

submitted to the jury.
2. The agreement was ambiguous as to whether Defendants
had been appointed as Tivoli' s managers.
Defendants claimed that they were Tivoli's managers and had
authority as managers to write these checks. R1554:96; 1520:35-36; 1521:210-
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11; 1535:126, 263; 1538:52-53.

But reasonable 1ninds could differ as to

whether they were managers under the Operating Agreement.
The recitals section stated that Tivoli' s members "intend to" appoint a
1nanager. Op.Agr. at Recitals, #3. The Definitions section defined the term
"1nanager" as meaning "a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not
consisting of a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to
manage the Company in accordance with Article VIL" Op.Agr. at 1.2.10.
By stating that Tivoli "intend[ed] to" appoint a manager, but not then

identifying Equity or Defendants as managers in the Definitions section, the
Operating Agreement at least implied that Defendants had not formally
been appointed as managers.
By contrast, Defendants relied on a provision stating that Equity had
authority to "manage and control the affairs of the Company." Op.Agr. at

7.l(a). While this language gave Equity (and, by extension, Defendants)
management authority, it did not clearly appoint Equity or Defendants as
official managers. Instead, given the above, one reasonable interpretation
\vould be that this was interim authority that i. vould exist until managers
1

were formally appointed.
Again, a conh·act' s language is ambiguous if reasonable minds could
differ about its interpretation.

Notably, the h·ial judge and the State's
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forensic accounting expert both stated at trial that they thought it unclear
whether Defendants were 1nanagers under the agreement, as did Bobbie
Posey, who testified that Defendants were not formally appointed as
managers. R1534:302; 1535:60; 1521:35; 1554:146; 1520:18.
3. The agreement was ambiguous as to limitations on
managers' authority.
The Operating Agreement contained a section that imposed
lirn.itations on managers' authority.

Op.Agr. at 7.5.

If Defendants were

managers, two of these limitations that would have been at issue contained
facially ambiguous terms.
First, as noted, a manager could not make "any significant material
purchase" of property ,vithout approval of 100% of the members. Op.Agr.
at 7.3.1. At trial, the State contended that several of the checks qualified as
"significant purchases." R1535:121-22. But the term "significant" was not
defined in the Operating Agreement, thus creating an ambiguity as to
whether these checks vlere prohibited.
Second, managers could not c01nmit "any act which would make it
impossible" for Tivoli to carry on its business. Op.Agr. at 7.5.8. The State
contended at h·ial that the loss of these funds made it "impossible" for
Tivoli to carry on its ordinary business.

R1535:121.-22.

But the term
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"in1possible" was not defined in this Operating Agreement, thus creating
another ambiguity.
In short, Defendants can only shm-v that the jury could not determine
this

question

if they

demonstrate

that

the

Operating

Agreement

unambiguously authorized these expenses. They have not. Because there
was a "legal basis" for the jury to determine that they did not have such
authority under the Operating Agreement, "it was for the jury to decide
whether a theft was cmnmitted." Larsen, 834 P.2d at 591. 7

C. If the court erred by submitting the question to the jury, the
error was harmless.
1. The improper submission of a legal question to a jury can

be harmless.
In Baird v. Denver R.G.R. Co., 162 P. 79, 81 (Utah 1916), the Utah
Supreme Court held that although a h·ial court had improperly submitted a
question of conh·act interpretation to the jury, tl~e error was harmless
7

Defendants do not appear to separately argue that, even if the
question vvas properly submitted to the jury, there was insufficient evidence
to support the jury's finding that these checks were unauthorized.
In any event, such an argument would plainly fail. The Poseys both
unequivocally testified that Defendants were not authorized to write these
checks for these purposes. See R1554:138, 142-43, 147-48, 160-63, 170-72
(Bobbie); Rl521:140-4], 147, 151-53, 171-77 (Kerry). This was supported by
an Equity board member ·who sat in on Tivoli's board meetings. R1534:7778, 80-92. And it vvas also supported by testimony from the State's
investigator, who testified that in an initial interview, Defendants both
admitted that they knew they '"'ere not authorized to use Tivoli funds for
anything other than the development of the 29 acres. R1534:192-93, 276.
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because "the jury found in accordance with what the court should have
declared as a matter of law."
This kind of situation does not appear to have since been addressed
by a Utah appellate court. But Baird's approach comports with the general
rule, which is that the "[s]ubmission of a question of law to the jury" is
harmless if the jury "answered as the trial court should have answered" it.
5 Am.J ur.2d, Appellate Review § 694; see also Sabatini v. Its Amore Corp., 455

Fed. Appx. 251 at *7 (3d Cir. 2011); Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Honolulu, 440 P.2d
526, 528 (Haw. 1968); Schneider v. Girard Trust Bank, 218 A.2d 259, 260 (Pa.
1966); Bank of America v. Jeff Taylor LLC, 358 S.W.3d 848, 865 (Tex. App.
2012).

2. Any error was harmless.

If the court should have interpreted the Operating Agreen1ent itself,
rather than subn1itting it to the jury, the error was harn1less because the jury
got it right. Indeed, if anything, the agreement unainbiguously prohibited
Defendants frmn ·writing these checks.
First, the Operating Agreement stated that Tivoli was organized for
the purpose of developing and selling "the Property," and it defined "the
Property" to refer to the 29 acres.

Op.Agr. at 1.2.16, 1.2.19, 2.4.
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The

agreement then limited Defendants' management authority to that purpose.
Op.Agr. at 7.1.
As noted, the recitals section also contained some language arguably
suggesting that the business purpose extended to any real estate
development. Op.Agr., Recitals, #1. But if this was indeed an unambiguous
contract as Defendants must clahn, then the more specific language
described above controls. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts

§ 203

(1981) ("In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a tenn thereof,

... (c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general
language."); accord Wood v. Utah Fann Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35, ,l7,
19 P.3d 392.

Second, the Operating Agreement prohibited a manager fron1 doing
anything that "would make it impossible" for Tivoli "to carry on its
ordinary business and affairs." Op.Agr. at 7.5.8. To the extent that this was
an unambiguous legal provision, the jury was entitled to detennine as a
factual 1natter that these expenses deprived Tivoli of funds it needed to
bring the 29 acres to entitlement, thus making it impossible to carry on its
purpose.
Third, the Operating Agreern.ent prevented a manager from n1aking
"any significant material" purchase ,vithout approval of 100% of the
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members. Op.Agr. at 7.5.1. To the extent that this was an unambiguous
legal provision, the jury was entitled to determine as a factual 1natter that
these expenses were "significant" - and that Defendants' use of the funds
was therefore unauthorized.
III.
Defendants were not entitled to a reduction of their
convictions based on their ownership interest in Tivoli.

In Point II of their brief, Defendants 1nake a two-part argument that
they claim should have resulted in the dismissal of all but four of the theft
counts.
First, the degree of offense for a theft depends on the value of the
stolen property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (West 2009). Defendants
argue that because they owned 75% of Tivoli, they owned 75% of its funds.
Aplt. Br. 35-42. Defendants then reason that because a "person cannot be
charged with stealing his own property," they could only be convicted for
stealing 25% of the value of each check. Id. According to Defendants, this
would have reduced all but four of the thefts to 1nisdemeanors. Aplt. Br. 19,
41-42.

Second, felony theft has a four-year statute of liinitations, but
1nisdemeanor theft has a two-year statute of lirnitations. Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-302(1) (West 2009). These charges were filed more than t\,vo years after
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the thefts, so Defendants argue that each theft that should have been
reduced to a misdemeanor should have been dismissed as untimely. Aplt.
Br. 41-42.
Defendants' arguments fail for two reasons.

First, Defendants'

claimed ownership interest provided no defense to theft. Second, even if
the ownership interest could matter, it didn't here because Defendants'
ownership was in Tivoli, not its money.

A. Defendants' ownership interest provided no defense to theft.
Under Utah law, it "is no defense" to theft if "the actor has an interest
in the property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that
the actor is not entitled" to infringe. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(2) (West
2009).

Defendants assert that they owned 75% of Tivoli and that the Poseys
m,vned 25%. Aplt. Br. 18-19, 41. Defendants thus admit that the Poseys
11

also ha[ d] an interest" in Tivoli. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(2). Because of

this, Defendants' interest- even their conh·olling interest- did not provide
them ,vith a "fractional" or "proportional" defense to the theft charges.
Rather, under Utah law, their interest provided "no defense" at all.
Defendants' claim fails for this reason alone.

-:P,-
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Id.

B. Even if Defendants' ownership interest in Tivoli could provide
a defense, it did not here because the interest was in Tivoli, not
its money.

A Utah LLC "is a legal entity distinct from its members." Utah Code
AnTl. § 48-2c-104 (West 2009).

While a 1nember of an LLC has

u

an

ownership interest in [the] company," Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(14)
(West 2009), the member "has no interest in specific property of a
company."

Utah Code Am1.. § 48-2c-701(1)-(2) (West 2009); accord In re

McCauley, 520 B.R. 874, 882 (Bankr., D. Utah 2014).
An LLC' s me1nbers "generally have been found to have no interest in
the LLC' s assets," including "111.embers who own all the interests in single
me1nber LLCs."

J.

William Callison and Maureen A. Sullivan, Limited

Liability Companies: A State-by-State Guide to Law and Practice, § 4:1 (2015).
\!\That a me1nber instead owns is a "share of the LLC' s profits and losses"
and the "right to receive dish·ibutions of LLC assets." Id.
This construct is set forth in Tivoli's Operating Agreement, which
defines a "membership interest" as a "Member's percentage interest in the
Con1pany, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive
dish·ibutions, participate in the Company's governance, approve the
Con1.pany' s acts, participate in the designation and removal of a Manager,
and receive information pertaining to the Company's affairs." Op.Agr. at
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1.2.12. Nowhere does the Operating Agreement separately grant members

an interest in Tivoli' s actual funds.
Though subtle, this distinction makes sense, and it is integral to the
proper functioning of the corporate system.

If a person owns stock in

Apple, for exa1nple, he owns a portion of the company. But that does not
mean that he also owns a portion of its money. For example, an Apple
shareholder could not walk into an Apple store, reach into the cash register,
and take out money equal to the value of his stock.
But that is essentially what Defendants are claiming that they could
do here.

Defendants are claiming that because they owned portions of

Tivoli, they owned an equivalent portion of its money and could use it
however they wanted. This argmnen t has been rejected, however, by a
wide array of cases from both Utah and other jurisdictions that have
affirmed theft or theft-related convictions in similar circumstances.
In State v. Stites, 297 P.2d 227, 229 (Utah 1956), for example, the Utah
Supreme Court upheld a shareholder's conviction for misapplication of
corporate funds, even though the shareholder" owned all but four shares of
the stock" and was "practically its only shareholder." The court reasoned
that "[s]o long as the corporation is an entity and owns the money, and that
money is ,vithheld or taken and used for non-corporate purposes, ... there
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is no escape fron1 the conclusion that there has been a wrongful and
intentional" misapplication of corporate funds. Id.
In State v. Radzvilowicz, 703 A.2d 767, 777 (Conn. 1997), the court
similarly stressed that it is "an elementary principle of corporate law that a
corporation and its stockholders are separate entities and that the title to the
corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owner of the
corporate stock." Thus, "even the controlling stockholder cannot h·ansfer or
assign the corporation's properties" or "apply corporate funds to personal
debts or objects." Id. Other courts have agreed, allowing convictions for
theft-related offenses where a shareholder misused or took corporate funds
without proper authorization.

See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 934 F.2d

1528, 1547 (11th Cir. 1991); LaPnrle v. State, 957 P.2d 330, 333-35 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1998); Stnte v. Hill, 296 P.3d 412, 418-19 (Idaho App. 2012); State v.

Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1994); State v. Gagne, 79 A.3d 448, 455
(N.H. 2013); State v. Gard, 742 N.W.2d 257, 262-63 (S.D. 2007).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has even applied this rule to a
case in which the defendant owned all of a company's shares. In State v.

Kornegay, 326 S.E.2d 881, 889 (N.C. 1985), the court reasoned that once
n1oney becomes the corporation's money, the defendant's ownership of the
con1pany- even

his

sole

ownership- becomes

irrelevant.
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"Havir1g

organized a corporation and conducted his business through it in order to
obtain the benefits and protections of the corporate form, defendant may
not now ignore the corporate entity and treat corporate funds as his own."

Id. If it were otherwise- i.e., if stockholders could "legally convert all of a
corporation's assets to their own use" - "those dealing with the corporation
on the faith of its property might be irretrievably injured." Id.
Thus, contrary to Defendants' position, they d_id not own Tivoli' s
funds. Rather, they owned portions of Tivoli itself. Because of this, they
could properly be convicted of theft for the full value of each check, and
their reduction-of-offense and statute of limitations arguments both fail. 8

8

The State recognizes that the prosecutor below suggested that the
Poseys also had an ownership interest in the funds. See, e.g., R1447; 1535:39,
156; 1538:19-20. Under the above authority, the Poseys were in the san1e
position as Defendants and did not.
But this Court may affirm on any ground apparent from the record.
Bailey v. Bnyles, 2002 UT 58, ,Jl0, 52 P.3d 1158. Here, Defendants the1nselves
repeatedly claimed that this ,vas Tivoli' s money. Sec, e.g., R1513:6-7 (Bruun' s
counsel arguing that the "money alleged to have been stolen in each of the
counts charged was never the property of the Poseys. It was in each case an
asset of Tivoli Properties, LLC."); R1514:6 (Diderickson's counsel arguing
that "this wasn't the Poseys' rn.oney. The money ,,vas an asset of Tivoli.");
R1535:68 (Diderickson' s counsel asserting to jury that if Defendants stole
anything," they "really committed a theft against Tivoli, not against the
Poseys, because it became Tivoli' s money").
11
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C. State v. Parker does not compel a different result.
Despite the above authority, Defendants argue that State v. Parker, 137
P.2d 626 (Utah 1943), compels a different result. Aplt. Br. 36-37.
In Parker, the court held that a car owner could be convicted of theft
for taking his car back from a 1nechanic before satisfying the mechanic's
lien. 137 P.2d at 626-34. Although the majority agreed on the result, the
case produced an unusually fractured lineup- four opinions came from the
five justices.
Defendants rely on a concurring opinion from Chief Justice Wolf.
After agreeing that this could be theft, the Chief Justice opined that under
common law rules regarding bailors and bailees, the amount of the theft
would be limited to the ainount of 1noney the owner owed the mechanic,
rather than the value of the car. Id. at 631 (Wolfe, C.J., ·concurring). Two
other justices expressed the same view.

Id. at 632-33 (McDonough,

J.,

concurring); id. at 634 (Wade, J., concurring).

Moreover, theft requires proof that the person exercised
"unauthorized conh·ol over the property of another," but it does not require
the jury to determine who the other owner was. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404;
nccord Larsen, 834 P.2d at 591 (Utah App. 1992) (to "obtain conviction for
theft, the State does not have to prove ,vho owned the property"). By
convicting Defendants, the jury found that the money was not theirs.
Legally, this was enough, and affirming on this ground is warranted.
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Defendants analogize this to this situation, claiming that their thefts
should be lin1ited by the an1ount of their interest in Tivoli. Aplt. Br. 36-37.
But the discussion at issue from the Parker opinions centered on the
11

special property" interest that a bailor has in the property under his

conh·ol.

Parker, 137 P.2d at 631 (Wolfe, C.J,, concurring).

As discussed

above, however, Defendants did not own Tivoli's funds; rather, they owned
a share in Tivoli itself.

Thus, the unique

II

shared ownership" concepts

inherent in Parker are not present here and the rule is inapplicable.
Moreover, the question in Parker was whether a bailee could be
charged with theft of his own property. Because the court held that a bailee
could, the discussion in the separate opinions about the amount of theft was
dicta. See id. at 626-34.
But Parker's

underlying holding has since been legislatively

abrogated. As noted, the current theft statute states that it "is no defense"
to theft if another person has an interest in the property. That provision
then goes on to state that this limitation does not apply when the other's
interest is "a security interest for the repayment of a debt or obligation."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(2). In other ,vords, the current law has re1noved
the State's ability to charge a bailee ,vith theft for taking his mvn property,
thus overruling the corn1non la,v doctrine at issue in Pnrker.
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Because of this, Defendants are ultimately relying on a dicta-derived
valuation rule that ·was applicable to a type of theft that no longer exists.
This is not good authority and should not be followed, particularly where it
conflicts with current rules prohibiting corporate theft detailed above.
IV.
Defendants did not receive ineffective assistance when their
counsel withdrew a request for a wrongful appropriation
instruction.

"Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense" of theft. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(4) (West 2009). Like theft, wrongful appropriation
requires proof that the defendant obtained or exercised "unauthorized
control over the property of another." Id. § 76-6-404.5(1 ). The difference is
that in wrongful appropriation, the person acts "with intent to temporarily
appropriate, possess, or use" the property. Id. (emphasis added).
I\ t trial, defense counsel specifically ,-vithdrew a request for a

wrongful appropriation insh·uction. R1537:214. Defendants now argue that
their counsel was ineffective for doing so. Aplt. Br. 42-47.
A. Defendants have not proven deficient performance.
1. Counsel had a legitimate reason to not request the

instruction.

Deiendants must first prove deficient performance. "An attorney's
performance is deficient under Strickland

jf it

can be shown to have fallen

-40Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

below an objective standard of reasonableness." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ,118.
Defendants must overcome a sh·ong presumption that counsel "rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013).
To overcome this sh·ong presmnption, Defendants must demonstrate that
"there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark,
2004 UT 25, i16, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original).
II

Thus, the threshold question under Strickland is not whether sO1ne
strategy other than the one that counsel en1ployed looks superior given the
actual results of trial. It is whether a reasonable, competent lawyer could
have chosen the sh·ategy that was employed in the real-time context of
h·ial." State v. Bareln, 2015 UT 22, ,l21, 349 P.3d 676; accord State v. Nelson,
2015 UT 62, ~16, 792 Utah Adv. Rep. 67.
Here, Defendants seem to suggest that because they were entitled to
the instruction, counsel was required to request it. Aplt. Br. 43-44. But the
Sixth Amendment "does not require counsel to argue every reasonable
theory" in a case. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15,
the conh·ary,

11

i154 (emphasis in original). To

counsel's decision to choose one of two al terna ti ve,

reasonable trial strategies is not grounds for an ineffective assistance of
counsel ruling."

Id. at ~53.

This extends to lesser included offense
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instructions, where this Court "generally affords deference to defense
counsel's decision to request or not request a lesser-included-offense"
instruction. Jackson v. State, 2015 UT App 217, ,18 n.7, -- Utah Adv. Rep. --.
Here, Defendants' counsel could have reasonably decided to not
request the wrongful appropriation instruction for two reasons.
First, counsel could reasonably decide to not request this instruction
as part of an '" all or nothing' strategy" - i.e., a sh·ategy designed to
maximize a defendant's chance for acquittal, rather than risking the chance
that the jury would convict on a lesser included offense as a compromise.

State v. Feldmiller, 2013 UT App 275, if3, 316 P.3d 991; accord State v. Dyer,
671 P.2d 142, 145 (Utah 1983); State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1967).
There was a particular reason why such an approach would 1nake
sense in this case. Defendants were businessmen with no prior criminal
records who ,,vere charged with non-violent offenses.

R1149-50, 1169-70

(PSI's). During a discussion midway through trial, the judge openly stated
that it was "outrageous" for defense counsel to have suggested in front of
the jury that the defendants might serve a lengthy prison term. R1536:62.
The judge then explained to the parties: "I doubt that the State is even
seeking prison in this case, let alone a consecutive sentence.

I have no

intention of putting these men in prison." Id.
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At that point, Defendants kne,"' that they faced no risk of long-term
incarceration. Because of this, their remaining risk was the possibility of
conviction itself. But given their backgrounds, n1any of the consequences
that would come with a conviction for theft would also come with a
conviction for wrongful appropriation.

After all, Defendants were self-

e1nployed real estate developers. Even if they were convicted of wrongful
appropriation, rather than theft, they still could have lost their professional
licenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2)(a) (West 2009) (DOPL .,,.may
refuse to issue a license" if an applicant "has engaged in unprofessional
conduct, as defined by state or rule"); Utah Code Ann. § 61-2£-401 (West
2009) (real estate licenses may be revoked if a person is "convicted of a
criminal offense involving moral turpitude" within five years); Utah
Admin. Code R. 162-2f-201(1)(ii) (certain real estate licenses "shall be
denied" if the applicant was convicted of "a misdemeanor involving fraud,
1nisrepresentation, theft, or dishonesty" within three years); Utah Admin.
Code R. 156-1-302 (allowing suspension of license if an applicant "has failed
to demonsh·ate good moral character" or "has been involved in unlawful
conduct").
Moreover, wrongful appropriation convictions could also have
dramatically impaired their future business prospects.

As noted, a
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wrongful appropriation conviction would
Defendants had temporarily
another's property.

represent a finding

exercised "unauthorized conh·ol"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1).

that
over

The fact that a

wrongful appropriation conviction would have only signaled a temporary,
as opposed to permanent, theft would likely have been of little reassurance
to prospective future investors, banks, or clients.
Counsel could

have

therefore

reasonably

decided

to

forego

requesting the insh·uction in the hopes that Defendants might be acquitted
outright. Given the complexities of this case, they were not without reason
to have such hope, as evidenced by Defendants' acquittal on the 1najority of
the theft charges.
Second, as a separate 1natter, counsel could also have reasonably
believed that an alternative defense of wrongful appropriation would have
hurt Defendants because it was "inconsistent" their Defendants' claim of
outright im1ocence. Feldmiller, 2013 UT App 275,

if 4.

Counsel could have

surn1ised that they could not credibly argue to the jury that Defendants
never intended to unlawfully deprive Tivoli of its funds at all ... but that if
they did, they only intended to f-empornrily deprive Tivoli of its funds.
Pushing such an approach could have jeopardized the possibility of any
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acquittal, and counsel could therefore have reasonably decided to withdrffw
the request for the instruction.

2. The record does not support Defendants' claim that the
decision to withdraw the instruction was unreasonably
based on an agreement with the prosecutor.
Defendants alternatively claim that counsel's decision to withdraw
the request for a wrongful appropriation instruction was unreasonably
based on an unfulfilled ''stipulation" frmn the State. Aplt. Br. 44-46.
As an initial matter, it does not matter whether this was counsel's
achrnl motivation. The question under Strickland's first element is whether
counsel's performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, Cjf17 (emphasis added). Thus,
this Court's "consideration of counsel's performance does not depend on
'counsel's subjective state of 1nind"; instead, what 1natters is "the objective
reasonableness of counsel's performance." Jackson, 2015 UT App 217,

if 19.

As discussed above, reasonably competent counsel could have
decided to not request the insh·uction here. This, alone, defeats this clain1.
Second, the record also does not support Defendants' claim that
counsel ,,vithdrev/ the request based on a stipulation ·with the prosecutor.
Aplt. Br. 44-46.
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After conviction, Defendants filed a new h·ial motion in which they
argued that the question of who owned what percentage of Tivoli' s money
was a legal question that should have been decided by the court. R1380-91.
Explaining the procedural history, defense counsel represented that they
had an agreement with the prosecutor in which they could wait to raise this
issue until after trial if they were convicted.

R1385.

Counsel further

represented that they had decided to not request a lesser included offense
instruction on wrongful appropriation "in anticipation of obtaining a
considered ruling" on the ownership issue after trial if it proved necessary.
R1383. Defendants then contended that, "[i]n hindsight" and with "more
1nature consideration," they believed that they should have pushed for a
ruling on ownership before the case was submitted to the jury. R1383-84.
Thus, the record does not support Defendants' claim on appeal that
their decision to withdraw the wrongful appropriation request ,vas part of a
stipulation with the State. Rather, the record shows that they 1nade the
decision the1nselves, based on their belief that they would either (1) be
acquitted by the jury, or (2) obtain legal relief after trial through a new h·ial
n1otion.
The fact that counsel later regretted this approach is of no import.
When revievving an ineffective assistance claim,

11

every effort" must be
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made to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" and "not question"
counsel's decisions "unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them."

Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ~16; accord Barela, 2015 UT 22, ~21.
As discussed, there was a reasonable basis for withdrawing the

request for a wrongful appropriation instruction: it put the State to a higher
burden of proof and made acquittal ·more likely. Regardless of whether
defense counsel later regretted that decision, it was still reasonable at the
thne, and Defendants' claim thus fails.
B. Defendants were not prejudiced because it is not probable that
the jury would have convicted them of wrongful
appropriation.

Defendants must also prove that there is "a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Here, there is not a
reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted Defendants of
wrongful appropriation if the insh·uction had been given.
As noted, the difference between theft and wrongful appropriation is
that in theft, the defendant has a "purpose to deprive" the owner of his
property, while in wrongful appropriation, he intends to "temporarily
deprive the m,vner" of his property. Compnre Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404

with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5.

-.:17-
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Bruun testified at trial. In his testimony, he never claimed that he and
Diderickson intended to ten1porarily steal Tivoli' s funds.

Instead, he

insisted that they had authority to use these funds for these purposes. See
R1535:265-71.

Given that Defendants steadfastly justified these checks, there was no
reason for the jury to believe that they intended to give the money back
after a temporary period. Because of this, there is no probability that the
outcome would have changed if the instruction had been given. 9

V.
Defendants have not proven that counsel was ineffective for
not requesting an additional UPU AA instruction.

Defendants were also convicted of one count of engaging in a pattern
of unlawful activity (UPUAA). R967-70. Under the UPUAA stah1te, it is a
crime for a person who is "associated with any enterprise" to "participate,
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of unlawful activity." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3)
(West 2009). A "pattern of unlawful activity" includes "the commission of

9

Defendants also claim that this is reviewable for manifest injustice.
Aplt. Br. 47. Under invited error, however, "a party on appeal cannot take
ad.vantage of an error committed at trial vv1hen that party led the trial court
into conu11itting the error." State v. Alfntlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ,I26, 153
P.3d 804. As noted, counsel affirmatively vvithdrew a request for a
wrongful appropriation insh·uction. R1537:214. Invited error thus bars this
clain1.
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at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not
isolated," and which "demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct."

Utah

Code Ann.§ 76-10-1602(2) (\Nest 2009).
The jury was instructed about all of the above elements and
definitions. R952-54. Defendants nevertheless argue that the instructions
were incomplete-but not because they omitted any statutory language.
Rather, Defendants argue that the court should also have instructed the jury
that to qualify as "continuing unlawful conduct," the thefts must have
"occurred over a substantial period of thne." Aplt. Br. 48.
Here, Defendants were convicted for writing checks over a nine111onth period-specifically, check 1007 (the basis for count 2) was written in
December 2007, while check 1070 (the basis for count 28) was written in
Septe1nber 2008. R69-78, 971-73; Addendum D. Defendants thus argue that,

if the jury had been instructed that the thefts must have occurred over a
"substantial period of time," it would have concluded that nine months did
not suffice and therefore acquitted them of UPUAA charge. Aplt. Br. 47-53.
Defendants admit that they never requested such an instruction
below, but argue that this should be reviewed for plain error or ineffective
assistance. Aplt. Br. 52-53.
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A. This Court cannot review this issue for plain error.

Under the invited error doch·ine, "a party on appeal cannot take
advantage of an error committed at h·ial when that party led the h·ial court
into committing the error." Alfatlawi, 2006 UT A pp 511, ~26. Where a party
"confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection to the
instructions given by the trial court," the invited error doctrine forecloses
plain error review. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, il 10, 86 P.3d 742.
During a break at trial, Bruun' s counsel informed the court that the
parties had "agreed on all but one instruction." R1537:213. The parties then
discussed the one remaining dispute with the court- a dispute that
centered on one of the theft insh·uctions. R1537:213-20. At the close of that
discussion,

defense

counsel

affirmatively

approved

the

remaining

insh·uctions. R1537:220. Defense counsel never separately pointed to any
deficiency in the UPU AA instructions.
Defendants accordingly cannot obtain relief for plain error. Instead,
they can obtain relief only if they dem.onsh·ate that counsel was ineffective.

Stnte z,. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, 'f:13, 248 P.3d 70. 10

10

Defendants also suggest that this is reviewable for a "manifest
injustice." Again, /J'manifest injustice" is "synonymous with the plain error
standard." Pullmnn, 2013 UT App 168, i,s. Defendants' "manifest injustice"
claim is accordingly likewise barred by invited error.
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B. Defendants have not proven deficient per£ ormance.

Defendants must first prove that counsel's performance fell "below
an objective standard of reasonableness."

Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ,118.

Defendants must prove that counsel's "representation amounted to
incompetence under prevailing professional norms," not just that it
11

deviated from best practices or most c01nmon cust01n." Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011).
Defendants' deficient performance claim fails for two reasons. First,
counsel did not perform deficiently because there was no conh·olling law
that entitled Defendants to such an instruction. And second, h·ial counsel
had several reasonable bases for choosing not to request the additional
insh·uction here.
1. No controlling law entitled Defendants to an additional
instruction.

Defense counsel's decisions must be evaluated

II

from counsel's

perspective at the time." Stricklmzd, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, to prove the first
St-r;ckland element, Defendants must demonsh·ate that, "on the basis of the

law in effect at the time of b·ial, [their] trial counsel's perfonnance was
deficient." Stnte v. Dwm, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993); see nlso Menzies v.

State, 2014 UT 40, i176, 344 P.3d 581.
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Defendants accordingly cannot prevail by simply showing that
counsel did not advance "a novel legal theory which has never been
accepted by the pertinent courts." State v. Love, 2014 UT App 175, ,I7, 332
P.3d 383. Instead, to show deficient performance, Defendants must show
that counsel disregarded "controlling appellate law" that existed at the time
of h ial. State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, ,r9, 228 P.3d 1255; see also In re N.A.D.,
4

2014 UT App 249, ,I6, 338 P.3d 226.
As noted, UPUAA requires proof of a "pattern of unlawful activity,"
and a "pattern of unlawful activity" is defined as "continuing unlawful
conduct."

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602(2), -1603(3).

According to

Defendants, what was missing here was an additional definitions
insh·uction that would define the phrase "continuing unlawful conduct" as
conduct that occurred over a. "substantial period of time." Aplt. Br. 47-52.
Thus, to be clear, what Defendants are faulting their counsel for is not
requesting an additional definitions insh·uction for one of the definitions of
one of the ele1nents of the UPUAA count.
The problem is that no case entitled them to this insh uction.
4

Defendants draw their proposed "substantial period of time" insh·uctior1
fr01n Hill v. Estnte of Allred, 2009 UT 28, ~~38-41, 216 P.3d 929. There, the

supreme court did suggest that the "continuing conduct" element of a
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UPUAA claim is satisfied if the conduct "extend[ed] over a substantial
period of time." Id.
But the question m Hill was not about the adequacy of jury
instructions. Rather, the question was about whether the evidence in that
case was sufficient to support the UPUAA conviction. See id. Although the
court used the "substantial period of thne" language as part of its analysis,
the court did not say that trial courts must always give an insh·uction
including that definition in every UPU AA prosecution.
Defendants point to no Utah case, and the State is aware of none, in
which any Utah court has held that a "substantial period of time"
insh·uction must be included in a UPUAA case. This defeats their claiin,
because, again, counsel does not violate the Sixth A1nendn1ent for not
advancing "a novel legal theory which has never been accepted by the
pertinent courts." Love, 2014 UT App 175, ~7.
This is particularly so here given that it remains an open question as
to whether such an insh·uction is required. While a "party is entitled to
have the jury instructed on its theory of the case" if evidence supports it, a
"party is not entitled to have the jury instructed with any particular
wording." State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, 'if 17, 284 P.3d 668. Thus, if
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"the jury instructions as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the applicable
law," "it is not error to refuse a particular instruction." Id.
As Defendants note, the UPUAA statute is patterned after the federal
RICO statute; it is for this reason that Defendants largely rely on federal
RICO cases to support this clain1. Aplt. Br. 50-51. But many federal courts
have held that a court is not required to include the "substantial period of
ti1ne" "clarification" in RICO jury instructions. Indeed, federal decisions
sometilnes go beyond that, holding that jury instructions are not even
required to include the "continuous conduct" definition for the "pattern of
unlawful activity" element.
In United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 250 (1st Cir. 1990), for
example, the court held that the element in a RICO prosecution is the
"pattern of unlawful activity." By contrast, "continuity is not an element of
a RICO offense," but is instead a "necessary characteristic of the evidence
used to prove the existence of a pattern." 898 F.2d at 250. Thus, while the
concept of "continuity" helps define the "pattern" element, the "word itself
should not be accorded talismanic significance," and its absence from the
jury insh·uctions does not constitute plain error. Id.
Many other federal courts have followed this approach.

See, e.g.,

United States v. Celesti1Ze, 43 Fed. Appx. 586, 591 (4th Cir. 2002) Gury
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insh·uctions 1nust "incorporate the concept of continuity," but it is enough if
the insh·uctions "requir[e] the jury to find a pattern of activity, and not just
isolated acts"); United States v. Kotvas, 941 F.2d 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 1991)
(no error where instructions did not include "continuity" requirement,
because instructions required proof of a "pattern"); cf United States v. Dote,
150 F.Supp.2d 935, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ('"Continuity' is not an ele1nent of a
RICO violation, and need not be plead with particularity to survive a
motion to dismiss"); United States v. Mavroules, 819 F.Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D.
Mass. 1993) ("continuity" "need not be alleged" in a RICO indictment
because "continuity is not an element of a RICO offense").
Thus, at the time of this h·ial, federal cases suggested that instructions
are sufficient if they insh·ucted the jury on the pattern of activity element, as
well as the concept of continuity. No Utah case required more. Because of
this, Defendants cannot show that their counsel performed deficiently by
not requesting an additional insh·uction.
2. There was a tactical reason for not requesting this
insh·uction.
II

A deficient performance claim also fails if there was any conceivable

tactical basis for counsel's actions." Clnrk, 2004 UT 25, ,I 6. Here, even if

Defendants were entitled to an additional instruction, counsel could
reasonably have decided to not request it.
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As noted, UPU AA requires proof that the person engaged in

u

a

pattern of unlawful activity," and it defines a "pattern of unlawful activity"
as

II

continuing unlawful conduct."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2), -

1603(3).
Hill addressed the question of what it means to be continuing." 2009
II

UT 28, ljf ,133-42. Interpreting that term, the court relied on heavily on

H.J.

Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), a decision that
interpreted a similar element in the RICO statute. Hill, 2009 UT 28, ,I,I33-42.
Hill concluded that there can be two kinds of "continuous" criminal

conduct. First, there may be a "closed" period of continuity, wherein the
conduct extend[ed] over a substantial period of tin1e." Id. at ~39. Second,
11

there 1nay be an "open" period of continuous conduct. Id.

This occurs

II

when the pattern of unlawful activity was interrupted" before it covered a
substantial period of time, but there was proof that it likely would have
continued without the interruption. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523,
1529-30 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if a UPUAA action is prosecuted as an open
continuity case, proof that there was a "threat of continuity" without the
interruption is enough. Hin 2009 UT 28, if 39.
Against this backdrop, defense counsel here could have reasonably
decided to not request a "substantial period of time" instruction.
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The

current instructions did not dra'"' attention to the open/ dosed continuity
II

distinction. But if counsel had requested an instruction on the substantial
period of time" definition, this would have drawn attention to this
distinction because, again, the substantial period of time definition only
applies to closed continuity cases. Hill, 2009 UT 28, 139; H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at
242.
But if this distinction became a focus, the State could have avoided
any "substantial period of time" limitation altogether by now pushing this
as open-continuity prosecution. Indeed, such an approach would have been
consistent with prior Utah cases, which have held that open continuity can
be established through short periods of time that rese1nble the period of
time at issue here. See, e.g., State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 635 (Utah 1988)
(open-continuity pattern spanned five months); State v. Nichols, 2003 UT
App 287, ~,flS-22, 76 P.3d 1173 (open-continuity pattern spanned
approximately six months). Indeed, federal courts have held that open
continuity can occur in as little as two months. See, e.g., Sun Savings and

Lomz Ass'11 v. Oierdoff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Busnccn, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, any tactical gains that
Defendants achieved through this insh·uction could have been short-lived if
the State simply shifted focus.
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Moreover, if the State had been prompted to pursue this as an opencontinuity case, this could have further backfired because of the particular
kind of proof at issue in such prosecutions. Again, the question in an opencontinuity case is whether there was a "threat of continuity" before the
pattern was disrupted. Hill, 2009 UT 28, if39; H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242. One
way to prove this is by showing that the criminal conduct was the
defendant's "regular way of conducting" business. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243.
When assessing an ineffective assistance claim, courts give deference
to the choices of trial counsel, in part, because, "unlike a later reviewing
court," the attorney "knew of material outside the record and interacted
with the client." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. On this record, it is conceivable
that the reason counsel avoided this issue was a worry the State would have
responded by pursuing this as an open-continuity case- which would have
then caused the State to inquire further as to whether Defendants' conduct
was indicative of their regular business practice.
Indeed, the record already provides a basis for such a worry.
Defendants had worked together on real estate projects for years.
R1535:208-09. When Bruun testified at h·ial, he was decidedly um·epentant,

repeatedly insisting that what he and Diderickson did with Tivoli' s money
was justified because they were Tivoli's managers. R1535:265-71. Notably,
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Bobbie Posey testified that when the Poseys n1et with Defendants to fonn
Tivoli, they signed forms that Defendants had drafted.

R1554:121.

One

reasonable inference from this is that this was the way that Defendants did
business.
Again, Defendants must show that there was no conceivable basis for
this decision. Here, counsel could reasonably have believed that requesting
an insh·uction that was only applicable to a closed-continuity UPUAA claim

(1) would not help, because the prosecutor could avoid any limitations by
pressing this as an open-continuity claim, and (2) it could have backfired by
pron1pting the prosecutor to now ask questions about Defendants' business
practices. This was reason to leave the jury instructions alone, and the
deficient performance claim fails.
C. Defendants were not prejudiced because it is not probable that
the jury would have acquitted them on the UPUAA count if
given the additional instruction.

Defendants must also prove prejudice. They have not.
First, if Defendants had pushed for a substantial period of tilne
instruction, the State could have simply avoided any limitation imposed by
this by now pressing this as an open-continuity prosecution. As noted, the
time period at issue here - nine months - is well within the range of periods
approved in such cases. See, e.g., NlcGmt-/-1, 749 P.2d at 635; Nichols, 2003 UT

-39-
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~

App 287, if ifl5-22.

Because of this, it is not reasonably likely that

Defendants would have been acquitted if this issue had been raised.

~

Second, even if the instruction had been given and the case was
confined to a closed-continuity construct, it is not reasonably likely that
Defendants would have been acquitted.
The term

II

substantial" commonly refers to something that is

"important" or "considerable." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Substantial (2),
(5) (2005 ed.). Because this concept is relative, the question of whether this

period of time was substantial was a jury question, and the jury could have
readily resolved it against Defendants.
As noted, Tivoli was formed in August 2007, and the checks for
which thev were convicted were written over nine months. R69-78, 971-73;
.I

Addendum D (checks 1007 & 1070). It is not reasonably likely that the jury
II

would have found that a nine-month period of thefts was not substantial."
True, the Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. suggested that in a closedcontinuity case, "[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and
threatening no

future

crin1inal conduct"

,vould not

"satisfy

this

requiren1ent," 492 U.S. at 242, and the Utah Supreme Court later adopted
this language in Hill, 2009 UT 28,

ilif38, 41.
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~

But

H.J. Inc. did not establish this as an inviolable rule. To the
II

conh·ary, the Court stressed that it would still employ a flexible approach"
and that it was "difficult to formulate in the absh·act any general test for
continuity." 492 U.S. at 241. Thus, even after the Court suggested that
11

II

conduct occurring over a few weeks or months would not suffice, the
Court stressed that the "limits of the relationship and continuity concepts
that combine to define a RICO pattern" "cannot be fixed in advance with
such clarity that it will always be apparent whether in a particular case a
pattern of racketeering activity exists." Id. at 243.
Defendants nevertheless rely on a series of cases suggesting that a
period does not qualify as substantial unless it extends for multiple years.
Aplt. Br. at 50. But these decisions run contrary to H.J. Inc., which, again,
endorsed a "flexible" approach to the question. 492 U.S. at 241. Moreover,
some federal courts have specifically rejected efforts to impose a set
require1nent. See, e.g., Allwaste, Inc., 65 F.3d at 1528 (rejecting "a hard and
fast, bright line, one-year rule," because "such a rigid requirement" "would
conh·adict the fluid concept of continuity enunciated by the Supreme Court
in H.J. Inc."); Calzfomia Pharmacy Mgmt., LLC v. Zenith Ins. Co., 669 F.Supp.2d
1152, 1162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (same).

-61-
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In short, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Utah
Supreme Court have imposed an inflexible rule of the sort pushed by
Defendants. Given this, it would have been up to this jury to determine
whether Defendants' nine-month pattern of thefts sufficed, and on these
facts, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have held that it did
not. This claim accordingly fails.
VI.

Defendants' restitution claim is unpreserved and should not
be reached.

Defendants argue that the court erred by not taking the terms of the
civil settle1nent into account when ordering restitution. Aplt. Br. 53. But
this issue is unpreserved.
Before sentencing, Defendants argued that the civil settlement
"preclude[d]" any restitution. R1077, 135; 1539:6-8. Defendants' claim was
essentially one of estoppel- that because the Poseys agreed to the
settlement, they were foreclosed from receiving any restitution in the
criminal case. See id.
Defendants were wrong. In State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ~15, 214 P.3d
104, the supreme court expressly recognized that the State's ability to

request restitution as part of a criminal sentence is separate from the
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victims' actions in a separate civil proceeding. Because of this, the court
correctly ordered restitution. R1539:22-25.
On appeal, Defendants do not renew the argument that they made
below, which, again, was that the civil settlement foreclosed any restitution.
Aplt. Br. 53-55. Instead, Defendants' argument now is that the restitution
order should have included an offset for the value that the Poseys received
in the civil settlement. See id.

But arguing that the civil settlement prevented the court from
ordering any restitution is fundamentally different from arguing that the
civil settle1nent should have been valued and then included in it. Again,
Defendants did the former, but did not do the latter. This is accordingly an
unpreserved claim and can be reached only if Defendants demonstrated
that a preservation exception applies "in [their] opening brief." Oseguera,
2014 UT 31, ~15.

Defendants did not.

Aplt. Br. 54-55.

This Court

accordingly should not reach the issue.
In any event, if this issue is considered, Defendants are wrong when
they suggest that the court should have accounted for the settle1nent m
either its complete or court-ordered restitution orders.

Aplt. Br. 54. A

complete restitution order accounts for" all losses caused by the defendant,"
while a court-ordered restitution order reflects the portion that the court
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orders the defendant to pay as part of the criminal sentence.

Utah Code

Ann.§ 77-38a-302(2)(a), (2)(b). If Defendants have indeed already paid some
amount to the Poseys, this would not change either aspect of this - i.e., it
would not change the overall amount of the Poseys' losses, nor would it
change the amount that the court believed should be attached to the
sentence.
Instead, if the settlement is to now be considered, the place to do so
would be as a credit in the court's ongoing accounting of how much
restitution Defendants have actually paid. If this is to be done, however, the
readjustment must include more than Defendants let on.
Defendants did not give the Poseys their property back as a
unilateral, one-way bequest that was intended to compensate the Poseys for
their losses. Rather, this ca1ne as part of negotiated, two-way transaction in
which Defendants gave the Poseys their property back in exchange for
$25,000. Addendum D at 1-2.

If Defendants' end of that h·ansaction is to be counted as restitution 1.e., as compensation for the harm the Poseys suffered from Defendants'
critnes - then Defendants cannot be allowed to keep the $25,000. Otherwise,
Defendants would essentially be in the position of charging their victin1s a
$25,000 restitution fee.
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Convicted criminals do not get to charge their victims for the right to
receive restitution. So if this civil settlen1ent is to counted as restitution, the
first thing that must happen is that the $25,000 must be taken back from
Defendants.
And the adjustment should not stop there. The State asserted below
that al though the Poseys received title to their property back in the
settlement, their property interests had been damaged in the interim by the
thefts, and that to stave off foreclosure, the Poseys were forced to negotiate
a settlement with the hard money lenders that ultimately caused them to
lose half of their property. R1064-67.
Defendants want restitution to be offset by the value of the property
the Poseys received in the civil settlement. But that begs the question of
how, exactly, to value it. If it is true that the title the Poseys received was
now compromised by a loan that ultimately forced them to lose half their
property, then that loss must be accounted for when determining how
much credit to give Defendants. Otherwise, Defendants would be receiving
credit for giving the Poseys property value that the Poseys never actually
received.
Res ti tu tion 1s intended to compensate the victims for "all losses"
caused by the crimes. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a). If Defendants
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want the civil settlement to be accounted for, both sides of it must be
included-including the full amount that Poseys lost through that
settlement.
But again, Defendants did not raise this argument below. Because
they did not brief a preservation exception, this issue need not be
considered. I I
VII.

This Court should not reverse for cumulative error

Finally, Defendants ask for relief for cumulative error. Aplt. Br. 55.
This Court reverses for cumulative error only if the cmnulative effect of
multiple errors undermines its confidence that the defendant received a fair
h·ial.

State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ~25, 999 P.2d 7.

Here, there was no

prejudicial error- either individ 1.1all y or cumulatively.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.

11

In Point V(b), Defendants argue that if any of their convictions are
reversed, "the portion of the restitution mvard associated with those counts
must also be reversed." Aplt. Br. 55. The State agrees. See State v. Larsen,
2009 UT App 293, i16, 221 P.3d 277 (restitution must be based on valid
conviction or agreement); see also United States v. Camick, 2015 VVL 4597562
(10th Cir., July 31, 2015) (setting aside portion of restitution based on
overturned convictions).
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§ 76-6-404. Theft- Elements
@

A person comn1its theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

@

®
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§ 48-2c-803. l\1anagement by members

In a member-managed company, each member shall be subject to the duties described
in Section 48-2c-807 and, unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in the articles of
organization, or an operating agreement:
(1) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding a majority of profits
interests ·in the company shall be required to decide any matter co1mected with the
business of the company;
(2) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of all members shall be required to:
(a) amend the articles of organization, except to make ministerial amendments
including:
(i) amendments made only to reflect actions previously taken with the requisite
approval, such as a change in managers; or
(ii) to change an address;
(b) amend the operating agreement, except to make ministerial amendments, including:
(i) amendments made only to reflect actions previously taken with the requisite
approval, such as a change in managers; or
(ii) to change an address; or
(c)(i) authorize a member or any other person to do any act on behalf of the company
that contra-venes the articles of organization or operating agreement; and
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (2)(c)(i) to terminate the authority so
granted; and
(3) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits
interests in the company shall be required to bind the company to any of the following
actions:
(a)(i) authorizing a member or any other person to do any act on behalf of the company
that is not in the ordinary course of the com.pany's business, or business of the kind
carried on by the company; and
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (3)(a)(i) to terminate the authority so
0aranted·
(b) making a current distribution to members;
I

(c) resolving any dispute connected vvith the usual and regular course of the company's
business;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(d) making a substantial change in the business purpose of the company;
(e) a conversion of the company to another entity;

(£) a merger in which the company is a party to the merger;
(g) any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
company's ·property other than in the usual and regular course of the company's
business;
(h) any mortgage, pledge, dedication to the repayment of indebtedness, whether with
or without recourse, or other encumbering of all or substantially all of the company's
property other than in the usual and regular course of the company's business; or
(i) any waiver of a liability of a member under Section 48-2c-603.
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§ 48-2c-804. Management by managers
In a manager-managed company, each manager and each member shall be subject
to Section 48-2c-807 and:
(1 )(a) ~he initial managers shall be designated in the articles of organization; and

(b) after the initial managers, the managers shall be those persons identified in
documents filed with the division including:
(i) amendments to the articles of organization;
(ii) the annual reports required under Section 48-2c-203; and
(iii) the statements required or permitted under Section 48-2c-122;
(2) when there is a change in the management structure from a member-managed
company to a manager-managed company, the managers shall be those persori.s
identified in the certificate of amendment to the articles of organization that makes the
chano-e·
O'

(3) each manager who is a natural person must have attained the age of majority under
the laws of this state;
(4) no manager shall have authority to do any act in contravention of the articles of
organization or the operating agreement, except as provided in Subsection (6)(g);
(5) a manager who is also a member shall have all of the rights of a member;

(6) unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement of
the company:
(a) except for the initial managers, each manager shall be elected at any time by the
members holding at least a majority of the profits interests in the company, and any
vacancy occurring in the position of manager shall be filled in the same manner;
(b) the number of managers:

(i) shall be fixed by the members in the operating agreement; or
(ii) shall be the number designated by members holding at least a majority of the profits
interests in the comF1a1w,, if the 01Jeratina
fails to designate the number of
O ao-recment
v
managers;
(c) each manager shall serve until the earliest to occur of:
1..

(i) the manager's death, withdrawal, or removal;
(ii) an event described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1)(f); or
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(iii) if membership in the company is a condition to being a manager, an event
described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1)(d) or (e);
(d) a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident of this state;
(e) any manager may be removed with or without cause by the members, at any time,
by the decision of members owning a majority of the profits interests in the company;
(f) there shall be only one class of managers; and

(g) approval by:

(i) all of the members and all of the managers shall be required for matters described in
Subsection 48-2c-803(2); and
(ii) members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company, and 2/3 of the
managers shall be required for all matters described in Subsection 48-2c-803(3).
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§ 48-2c-701. Nahtre of member interest

(1) A member's interest in a company is personal property regardless of the nature of
the property owned by the company.
(2) A member has no interest in specific property of a company.

@
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
FOR LAND

l:[rah Association
0

.,El,LTOi<'

This is a legall y binding contract. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor.

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
Buyer Equity Partners LLC offers to purchase the Property described below arid hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as
Earnest Money, the amount of $.5.QQ. in the form of check which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined
in Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with state law.

•

Received by:

roelle/2- coJ,lf/!.OtteR...

["flt/)I~

on

6 _;.. _
---=3_·.....;..-0_0_-_
.7 _ (Date)

(Signature of agent/ciroker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money)

Brokerage: _ _ _ _ _ _
j)--f-/-+-1/--_,___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I

Phone Number: __/J'--1-f'-'4..J..
_ _ _ __

OFFER TO PURCHASE

7116,lv lo Boo CJ

S!re[ftae-11

~,0A;{)6--.5
1. PROPERTY: Address
Acre: also described as: . !.T. ld.!lxe.. Jlc.!=D~#!.!______________________________
Tax ID# City of Saratoaa Springs County of ill.ah State of Utah, ZIP

8:z'O 1/_c;'

(the "Property").

1.1 Included Items. ( s p e c i f y ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

•

1.2 Water Rights/Watei Shares. The following yvater. eights and/or water shares are included in the Purchase Price .
/. 6
Shares of Stock in the
EX. l S lt/J CcJ eL,,{_.,.
(Name of Water Company)
[ ] Other (specify)-- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[]

2. PURCHASE PRICE The purchase price for the Property is $3,500,000
The purchase price will be paid as follows:
$50.Q_ (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Co
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
$3.499,500 (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for one or more of the following loans:
..
[ J CONVENTIONAL [ ] OTHER (specify)-- - - - - - - - - - - If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details:
[ J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ (c) Seller Financing. (see attached Seller Financing Addendum, if applicable)
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ (d) Other (specify). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
$._ _ _ _ _ _ (e) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement.

$3.500,000

PURCHASE PRiCE. Total of lines (a) through (e}

3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING . Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in S ection 24(c), or
on a date upon which Buyer and Seller agree in writing. "Settlement" shall occur only when all of the fo llowing have been
completed : (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b)'any mo nies require d to be
paid by Buyer under tl,ese documents (except for t he proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller
or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller
under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the fo rm of colle cted or
cleared f unds. Seller a nd Buyer shall each pay one- half(½) of the fee charged by t he escrow/closing o ffice for its
services in the settlement/closing process. Taxes and .assessments for the current year, rents, and interest o n assumed
obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section. Prorations set forth in this Section shall be m ade as
of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(c), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such
writing could inc lude· t he settlement statement. The transaction will be considered closed when Settle m ent has been
completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delive red by
"lie Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office ; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the
fice of the cou nty recorder. The actions describ ed in parts (i) and (i i) of the preceding sentence sh a ll be compTeted
·thin four calendar days of Settlement.
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliv ~hysical possession to Buyer within : [ J Upon Closing

Reacordina
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[X] Othe r (specify) 81

Date

8 ~/o --0?

·:s: CONFIRMATION OF AGI¥JJCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this contract:

.·r.

] Seller's Initials [ff{!;,] Buyer's Initials

AJ_~~'
., . . .lil - - - - - - - - - '

·sting Agent _. _ _ _.........

JJ

represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ) both Buyer and Se

Iv,_

as a Limited

..• ,

sting Broker for _____fV--+-U_,..,____________,, represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
' (Company Name)
as a Limited Agent;

;j-l/. . ./4_________,

Buyer's Agent _ _ _ _
represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
1
JJ ; ~
as a Limited Agent;
Buyer's Broker for _ _ _i--+-v(_
J/1:{__.,,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,, represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
(Company Name)
as a Limited Agent;

6. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement. Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense.
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Seller shall provide
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures 11 :
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property. signed and dated by Seller;
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance;
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
(d} written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems;
(e) evidence of any water rights and/or water shares referenced in Section 1.2 above: and
(f) Other (specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this
Contract (check applicable boxes):
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in
Section 7;
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property;
(c) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor;
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of applicable federal, state and local governmental laws.
•dinances and regulations affecting the Property; and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's (covenants,
Jnditions and restrictions) affecting the Property;
(e) [X] IS· [ ] 1s· NOT conditioned upon the Property appraising for not less than the Purchase Price;
(j) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the terms and conditions of any mortgage financing
referenced in Section 2 above;
(g) [ ] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify)
If any of items B(a) through B(g) are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 appiy; otherwise, they
do not apply. The items checke'd in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as Buyer's "Due Diligence." Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract, Buyer's Due Diligence shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due Diligence and with a final pre-closing
inspection under Section 11.

8.1 Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a)
complete all qf Buyer's Due Diligence; and (b) determine if the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer.

8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable. Buyer
may, no later than the Due Diligence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Setter,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seifer with written notice of objections.
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel this Contract

as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's
Due Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections B(a) through B(g),
including but not limited to, any financing contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer.

8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of
solving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
'ljections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may
. _..tncel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under
tl1is Section 8.4, Buyer's objecti~os
s II b~ ~ymed waiv:9 by)3uyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted
in Section 10.

ii;,

!Jjl0j(}-9-
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9. ADDITION.AL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there
~re, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [X] Addenda No.'s 1 [ ]
,eller Financing Addendum [ ] Other (specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

ti;

10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and marketable
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the
following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and
rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8.
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing.
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other services
provided to the Property after Closing. Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments,
mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners
association dues.
IF ANY PORTION OF THE PROPERTY IS PRESENTLY ASSESSED AS "GREENBELT" (CHECK APPLICABLE

BOX):
~

[X] SELLER [ ] BUYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF ANY ROLL-BACK TAXES ASSESSED
AGAINST THE PROPERTY.
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a) the Property shall be free of debris and personal property;
(b) the Property will be in the same general condition as it was on the date of Acceptance.

"'

11. FINAL PRE-CLOSING INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable
time, conduct a final pre-closing inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is 11 as represented,"
meaning that the Property has been repaired/corrected as agreed to in Section 8.4, and is in the condition warranted in
Section 10.2. If the Property is not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, repair/correct the Property, and place
the Property in the warranted condition or with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at
Settlement sufficient to provide for the same. The failure to conduct a final pre-closing inspection or to claim that the
r:>roperty is not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the
·operty as represented.

~

12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made;
(b) no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances affecting the Property shall be made.

\Iii 13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company or
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and
Seller.

14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
~ representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
( check applicable box)
[ ] SHALL
[X] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
~ first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation
fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforc_e this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, in
~
jdition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
1oney Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies
,ailable at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon
demand.

~

17. ATfORNEY FEES AND

CO;wTStl
t

\ 02
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· cp~rttshall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation
, in mediation under Section 15.

•

B. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed
•JY the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date
iferenced in this Contract.
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.

20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed.

21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly-stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and
(b) the term 11 days11 shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers
the timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not be binding upon
title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to in writing by
such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. ·

23. ACCEPTANCE. 11 Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a)
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the othe~ party or to the other
partys agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.

_24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
{a) Seller Disclosure Deadline

>) Due Diligence Deadline
(c) Settlement Deadline

_ ____;;:8::;...__-_/_S-_-:-_0_7
_ _ _ (Date)
_ ___,8::;..__.-_2-_o_-_o_7____ (Date)

!5'-

7

(5 _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ __..,Q...,....:;...._ _
v"2(5___

(Date)

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If
Seller does not accept this offer by: _ _ _ _ _ [ ] AM [ ] PM Mountain Time on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Date),
this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer.

flr?h-~11~

..

(Buyer's Signature)
(Offer Date)
(Buyer's Signature)
(Offer Date)
The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date"

Equity Partn1;1rs LLC

GoS)) Li ;;;o t,eJ Ufllir?#/rfo

(Buyers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address)

;tl,dJP
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ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
. ~HECK ONE:
i. ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified
'Jove.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO. _ _ _ __

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

·(Notice Address)

(Date)

(Zip Code)

{Time)

(Phone)

[ ] REJECTION: Seller rejects the foregoing offer.

~

. (Seller's Signature)

{Date)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

This form is COPYRIGHTED by the UTAH ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS® for use solely by its members. Any unauthorized use,
modification, copying or distribution without written consent is prohibited. NO REPRESENTATION IS MADE AS TO THE LEGAL
VALIDITY OR ADEQUACY OF ANY PROVISION OF THIS FORM IN ANY SPEClFiC TRANSACTION. IF YOU DESIRE SPECIFIC LEGAL OR
TAX ADVICE, CONSULT AN APPROPRIATE PROFESSIONAL.
COPYRIGHT@ UTAH ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®- 7.8.04 - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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ADDENDUM NO.

1

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

1

(El'
~

OPPOA.TUKITY

THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of
/tJ. - 0 7
including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between
E'l,Wt l'llfttP94 Ltc
. . as Buyer, and Ao6bte eos~t lfpb Ke&t t4oser:: as Seller,
regarding the Property located a t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · The
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:

8-

price of property is based on city approval of conceptual plan tor· Rezoneing _to R-3
with 20% density bounus.
2- Purchase price of property is based on city approval of conceptual plan for rezoning 4-5 acres of
property along Redwood Road to commercial/mixed use.
3- Subject to legal review.
1- Pur.chase

BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX}: ~REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: _ _ _ _ _ __

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until _ _ _ _ [ ] AM [ ] PM
Mountain Time on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with
the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.
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(X'] Buyer [

-v-07-] Seller Signature

(Date)

{Time)

[

Buye

XJ_Seller Si

ature

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION

14'

CHECKONE:
~CCEPTANCE:

P(_Seller

[ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.

[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. _ __

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

{Signature)

{Date)

(Time)

(Date}

(Time)

[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

{Date)

(Time)

{Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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ADDENDUM NO.

[Q

2.

2.

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

REAL.TO~

THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
a~ffer Refer,9ince _Qate of
..
including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between
, J ,b Va,a ~
L
L
C..
as
Buyer,
and
.
as Seller,
1
regarding the Property located at7Slla ND· 1l>600 LJ.). ,
~nYl:r•
S--lOL.15 . The
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:

Sa.n:tf~a.

ut:

IT rs AGREED BETWEEN THE SELLER AND BUYER AS FOLLOWS:
1. Bu er ro o es to

lat and subdivide the ro ert which is the sub'ect of this A reement accordin to
C
TY Code and re· uirements. Bu er will seek ANNEXATION a
SUBDIVISION for the entire parcel.
2. Fulfillment of this offer to purchase is contingent on Buyer determining to his sole satisfaction that the
project is .economically feasible.
3. In the event Buyer determines the project is not feasible for any reason then the Earnest Money
accompanying this Agreement Will revert to Buyer unless other arran2ements are agreed between the Buyer
and Seller. Buyer will also provide all the product of his work on the site to date but at no cost to the Seller and
this Agreement will be deemed null and void.
4. In the event governmental approvals are still pending and imminent upon expiration of the time period noted
in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, then closing for the Agreement will be automaticallv extended for a period
of /;LO
days.
5. Seller agrees to join with Buyer in the proceedings and in the execution of any petitions, plats or dedications
which mav be required for development of the realty but at no expense to the Seller.
6. Seller grants permission for the Buyer or his representative to enter onto the propertv for the purpose of soil
tests, surveying, and all those studies necessary to prepare the realty for development.
7. Buyer herebv indemnifies and saves Seller harmless from any liens or accidents that may arise because of·
Buyer's activitv on the land.
8. Seller warrants the property which is the subject of this Agreement is free of hazardous wastes and has never
been used as a toxic waste dump of any kind. In the event hazardous wastes are discovered on the site Buyer
may abandon the project and all Earnest Money will be returned to Buyer
9. In the event unusable wetlands are found to exist on the site, those identified wetlands plus buffer areas will
be deducted from the purchase price on a per square foot basis.
ALL THE OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS of the Agreement remain unchanged.

J ct

BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [>Q_ REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: _ _ _ _ _ __

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until _ _ _ _ [ ] AM [ ] PM
Mountain Time o n - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - (Date}, to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with
the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse .
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'( I/flt~
[ j s'uyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. _ __

X

(Signature)

(Date)

(Signature)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buy~r r~jects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5 1 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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(X

SELLER ~INANCING ADDENDUM

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
11

THIS SELLER RNANCING ADDENDUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT {the •REPC )
with an Offer Reference Oa1e of August 10, 2007, between Equity Partners, LLC as Buyer, and Kerry and
Bobbie Posey as Seller, regarding the Property located at 7916 N 10800 N Saratoga Springs 84045- The tenns
of this ADDENDUM are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC.
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS. Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [X] Note and Deed of Trust [ ]
Note and All-Inclusive Deed of Trust [ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
2. CREDIT TERMS. The tenns of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above are as follows:
$2,750,000 principal amount of the note (the •Note•); interest at !l°k per annum; payable at approximately $.Q per .Q. The
entire unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due in 12 months from date of the Note. First payment due 12.
months. Additional principal payments. balloon payments or other terms as follows:

The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will ·contain a due-on-sale clause in favor of Seller.
Seller agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written
disclosure of 1he total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based
on loan dosing costs.

3. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shall also be
responsible for: (a) property taxes; (b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments; and (d) hazard insurance
premiums on the Property. These obligations will be paid: [ ] directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basis [X]
directly to the applicable county treasurer, association, and Insurance company as required by those entities.
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 above will be made to: [X] Seller [ ] an Escrow Agent. If an
Escrow Agent, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ will act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing
payments on any underlying mortgage or deed of trust (the •underlying mortgage•) and to the Seller. Cost of setting up
the escrow account shall be paid by: [ ] Buyer [ } Seller [X] split evenly between the parties.

5. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within ll days after it is due is subject to a late charge of $.Q
or .Q°k of the installment due, which~ver is greater. Amounts in d$ult shall bear interest at a rate of ,Q% per annum. All or
part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penalty.

6. DUE-ON-SALE. As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 of the AEPC, Seller shall provide to Buyer a
copy of the underlying mortgage, the note secured 1hereby, and the amortization schedule. Buye.,.s obligation to purchase
under this Contraci is conditioned upon Buyer"s approval of the content of those documents, in accordance with Section 8
of the REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of this transaction, Buyer agrees to
discharge the underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event. Seller's remaining equity shall be paid
as provided in the credit documents.

7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer
Financial Information Sheet. Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate
Commission and the Attorney General's Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format,
together with such additional information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [X] WILL· [ ] WILL NOT provide
Seller with copies of IRS returns for the two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyer's
current employer for verification of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial Information Sheet.
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buyer shall provide
to Seller, at Buyers expense, a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer crecfit reporting agency. Seller may use
the credit report and 1he infonnation referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum ("Buyer Disclosuresa) to evaluate the credit
worthiness of Buyer.
8.1 Seller Review. By the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, Seller shall
review the credit report and the Buyer Disclosures to determine if the content of the credit report and the Buyer
Disclosures, is acceptable. If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller
may elect to either: (a) provide written objections to Buyer as provided in Section 8.2 of this ADDENDUM; or (b)
immediately cancel the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced
in Section 24{c) of tile REPC. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written ~~of cancellation, shall return
Page 1 of 2 pages
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Date_ _ _ _ _ _ Buyer's lnitials___
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to Buyar the Earnest Money Deposit.

8.2 SeUei Objections. If Sellar does not immediately cancel the REPC as pn::?vida_d: cµ,ove, Sel~(?,r may, by the
Evaiuations & Inspections Deadline reierenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, provide Buyer with written objecijons. Buyer

and Seller shall have sew-an crusndar days a~iar Buyers receipt of the objections (tha •Response Period 11) 'in which to
agree in writing upon the manner of resoiving Seiiers objections. Buyer may~ but shaU not be required to, resolve Sellers
objecttons. If SeUei and Buyer have not agreed in wi'iting upon tt.e manner of rasoMng ·Sellar's objections, Sellar may
cancel the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer no later ihan three caiendar days after expiration of the Response
Period. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Sellars written notiee of can~Uation. shaJI rGttim to Buyer the Earnest
Money Deposit
3.3 FaHme tu Object. If Sellei does not deU·.,-er a wmten objection to Btrfar raga;ding the credit raport or a Buyer
Disciosure by the Evaiuations & inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(cj of ihe REPC or cancel the REPC as
provided in Seeilons 8.1 or 8.2 of this ADDENDUM, the credit repOt-t and Buyer Disclosui-c::, will be deamed approved by
Seller.

'

9. TITLE iNSURANCE. Buyer [ ] SHALL [X] SHALL NOT provide io Seller a lender's policy of tftle insurance in the
amount of the indebtedness to the Seller, and shall pay for such policy at Settlement.

1G.. DiSCLOSURE OF TAX IDENTIFICATIC.'\1 NUMBERS.. g.y no (a&Lelr than Sa4Hamant, Buyer and Saller shall disclose to
each other thair raspectt-,;a Social Sacumy Numbara or othei applirahla tax idantffication numbers so that they may
comply with iederat laws on reporting mortgage interest in fiiings wiih ihe iniemai Revenue Service.
To the extent the ter.ns of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of tha REs°C, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall cont-al. AU other tenns of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [X] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until .§.:00 [ ] AM
PM
Mountain Time on Noyembei 12, 2007 (Datej, to accept the terms u1 this SELLER FINANC:NG ADDENDUM in
accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted7 the offer as set forth in this SELLER
FINANCING AD~~UM shan lapse.

Dll

f!tfl..- ~

1·rs

i.)6 Buyer [

j Selier Signature

[ ] .Bt.ryer [

J Seller Signature

r1#7JJIK/42- c~udf#1/lt~,Q._3
(Date}

..L..

\ I ITTl9}

Sociai Security Number

{T!me)

Saci.at Security Number

CHECK ONE:

\.i

J>'1 .ACCEPTANCE: P,:Selier [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the ierms oi this ADDENDUM.
[ J. COUW.Ef:CF!=~R: f ] Se!isr [ ] Sli-yer presents as a counteroffer.the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. _ __
~-;_,--·
J(J . ~
h ~L2

/~!'-

;I

{Signature)

{I~

.

-:,,

(Date)

~

.

r~i"

(llme)

e)

(Time)

(Date)

t!tme}

[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing SELLER FINANCING

{Signature}

(Date)

(Time}

(Signature}

IB:S FomA A~~6::0 ~ ffl~ ~"TA:-: ~ t ESTA~ CQ~~:O~:O:.: ~a.!n TME Office OF TI-!!: t.rr~~ ATTO!=!~E'! GENE.0 .ru_,
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THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM
an Offer Reference Oat~ of

r ] C~UNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
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-

P ~ , LL c_

Cc-qu\~
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, including all prior addenda nd counteroffers, between

as Buyer, and
regarding
property located at ' / q I ' ,..J
/ 0 '? OD
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:
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I
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ADDENDUM NO. ~
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

/?;-rr-61,-..{_

rp,,-tc{
)/

~

-

·

/' /

L.t..

~

./
,•

·

/,

,

as Seller,
The

fl' 0 V

r.

·

BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK ~PPLICABLE BOX): [ ] REMAIN UNCHANGED J>¥ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: _ _ _ _ _ __
!l l( . C. =- 11 I ll I o 7

.

I

I

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [><l Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until 8 ~ 0-0 [ ] AM [..:x)_PM
Mountain Time on I /1 :>-- I 07
(Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse .

I

J)(l

.fJVkl-~
Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
ACCEPTANCE: [%Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.

J><l'

] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terlJIS of attached ADDENDUM NO. _ _ .

~
(Date)

(Time)

(Time)

[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time}

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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TOREALESTATEPURCHASECONTRACT
ADDENDUM NO.

ADDENDUM ( ) to reference date of 8-10-07 between Equity
Partners,LLC(names) 81/rJ/l.J ARtl~ Jfkc)es 1?1d-rlck5Pi1

<luulfllc!ea:,a
tl/adrm,c rta,1m,
1
. Jl
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ as buyers. Kerry R
and Bobbie M Posey as SELLERS. The following terms are hereby
incorporated as part of the REPC:

l. Addendum # 3 is solely for ;btaining a loan from money people. (lg r, d C2/2S)
2. Purchase price remains at $3,500,000 for 29 plus acres and buildings.
Payoff is to be distributed as fol lows .....

Kerry to receive$ l 000 weekly, Bobbie to receive $1500 weekly.
Commencing O 1,.,_z w ~ cJ..ft~ clc 'Yi~~ .
$_-7_c:)(_·_o_,_G_c_o
____ to be received at Hard tvioney after entitlement.

House and barn to be vacated by / cJ

d~o- ciH~
I

~-;,r(/-i'~

Poseys get salvage right~ as to buildings being tom down.

~ /;;JJ..::...
~~

t,uyers -4:f(j!'}-,

_

c::>

_- - - - - - - - - - - - 11-14-2007

rr~ ,. -,,:.

~ c ~ l • c _ __

I

i!-14-2007

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. -Settlement

Statement

U.S. Department of Housing

0MB No. 2502-0265(i;)

and Urban Development

B. Tvoe of Loan
I. D FHA
4. D VA

2. 0 FmHA
S.
Conv Ins.

•

3. D Conv Unins
6. 0 Seller Finance

6. File Number
0715783-MN

7. Loan Number

8. Mortgage Ins Case Number

-C.-N-ot_e_:_Th_is_fi_o_nn-is-fu_m_i-sh_ed_t_o_g_iv_e_y_o_u_a_s_t_at_em_en.....t_o_f_a_c_tu_a_l_se_t_tJem--en_t_co_sts-.-A-mo_,_u_n_ts_p_a_id-to_a_n_d_b_y_t_h_e_se_t_tl-em-en_t._ag_en_t_ar_e_s_h_o_wn
__-1-tc_ms_m_ar_k_ed----~

"lo.o.c.)" were oaid outside the closine: thev are shown here for infonnational oumoscs and are not included in the lotaJs.
D. Name & Address of Borrower
E. Name & Address of Seller
F. Name & Address of Lender
Equity Partners LLC
Kerry Roger Posey and Bobbie Marie Posey
K E Capital Services
7240 South Highland Drive #200
Snit Lake Oty, UT 84121

G. Property Location

H. Settlement Agent Name
Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc.
7240 S Highland Dr Ste 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 Tax ID: 87-0671335

7916 North 10800 West Saratoga Springs, UT 84045
7916 North 10800 West
Saratoga Springs, lJf 84045

Place of Settlement

I. Settlement Date

Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc.
7240 S Highland Dr #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

11/16/2007
Fund: 11/19/2007

J. Summary of Borrower's Transaction

K. Summary or Seller's Transaction

100. Gross Amounl Due from Borrower

400. Gross Amount Due to Seller

I OJ • Contract Sales Price
102. Personal Property
l 03. Settlement Charges to borrower

402. Personal Property
$64,556.73 403.

lnA

AnA

J 16.

416.

120. Gross Amount Due From Borrower
200. Amou11ts Paid By Or in Behalf Of Borrower

201. Deposit or earnest money
202. Principal amount of new loan(s)

S3,500,000.00

$3,500,000.00 401. Contract SnJes Price

SJ,564,556.73 420. Gross Amount Due lo Seller

$500.00
$750,000.00

501. Excess Deposit
502. Settlement Charges lo Seller (line 1400)
Existing Loan(s} Taken Subject lo
Payoff of first mortgage lo·an
Payoff of second mortgage loan
PAYOFF I ST MORTGAGE

203. Existing loan(s) taken subject to
204. Loan Amount 2nd Lien
205.
206.

503.
504.
505.
506.

207.
208.

507. PAYOFF 2ND MORTGAGE

508. 2007 TAXES

209. SELLER CARRY BACK

01/01/07 thru 11/16/07

510. County Property Ta."'es

511. Assessment Ta.xcs

212. HOA Dues

512. HOA Dues

213.

513.
514.
515.
516.

214.

215.
216.
217.

517.

218.

518.

219.

519.

301. Gross Amount due from borrower (line 120)
302. Less amounts paid by/for borrower (line 220)

$307,063.60

$39,112.86
S2, 750,000.00

Adjustments for items unpaid by seller
Sl,552.62

211. Assessment Taxes

220. Total Paid B:v/For Borrower
300. Cash Al SeUlcment Fromffo Borrower

$7,873.00

$1,906.69

S2, 750,000.00 509. SELLER CARRY BACK

Adjustmcn~ for items unpaid by seller
2 IO. County Property Taxes

$3.S00,000.00

500. Reductions in Amount Doe to Seller

0l/01/07 thru I I/ I 6/07

$3,502,052.62 520. Total Reduction Amount Due Seller
600. Cnsh At Scttlemcnl To/From Seller
$3,564,556.73 601. Gross Amount due to seller (line 420)
SJ,502,0S2.62 602. Less reductions in amt. due seller (line 520)

Sl,552.62

$3, I07.S08. 77
SJ,500,000.00
$3, I 07,508.77

303. Cash From Borrower

$62,504.11
Section 5 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RfSPA) m1uircs the
following: • HUD must develop a Special lnfonnalion Booklet to help persons
borrowing money to finance the purchnse
residential real estate to better
understand the nature and costs real estate sclllcmcnt services;

603. Cash To Seller
$392,491.23
Section 4(a) of RESPA mandates that I IUD develop and prescribe this standard
fohn to be used al the lime of loan settlemenl to provide fiJII disclosure of all
or
charges imposed upon the borrower and seller. Th<.-se arc third party disclosures
or
that arc designed to provide the borrower with pertinent infommtion during lhc
• Each lender must provide the booklet to c1II ap11licants from whom it receives
sctllemcnt process in order lo be a helter shopper.
or for whom it prepares a wrilten application lo uorrow money to finance the
The Public Reporting Burden for this collection of information is estimated to
purclmse of residential real estate;
• Lenders
mustHoward
prepare W.
andHunter
distribute
with
Digitized
by the
Law
Library,
J. Reuben
Clarkper
Law
School,including
BYU. the time for reviewing inslmclions
average
one hour
response,
the Booklet a Good Faith Estimate of the sclllcmcnt costs
that the borrower
is may
scmching
Machine-generated
OCR,
containexisting
errors.dnta sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and

(II

:,; U C

--~lt.

VI I J IOJ-JVll'I

L. Sclelcinenl_ Charges

700. Tota l Sak s/llrnker's C ommission based o n price

S3,500,000.00

@%

S0.00

•

702.

Paid From

Borrower's

Seller's

to

Funds at

Funds al

10

Selllcment

Settlement

Division of Commission (line 700) as follows:
70 I.

Paid P rom

703. Commission !'aid at Settlement

S0.00

SO.OU

800. !terns l'ay nblc in Connection with LoRn

801. Loan Originalio n Fee
802. Loan Oiscou11t

%

to

%

to

803. Apprnisal Fee

lo JOE DUNLOP

804. Credit Report

lo

805. Lender's Inspection Fee

to

806. Mortgage Jnsumnce Application

to

807. Assumption Fee

lo

$500.00

808. PROCESSING l'EE

to KE Ca pita l Services

$500.00

809. INTER.EST AND POINTS

to J( E Capita l S en-ices

$61,489.73

1003. County Property Taxes

months @

1004. Assessment Ta~cs

months@

per month

1005. HOA Dues

month s@

per montl1

1006.

montl1s@

per montl1

1007.
1008.

months@

per month

moutl1S @

per montl1

$147.58 per month

IO 11. Aggregate Adjustment
I lllO. Tille Charges
l l OI. Setllemenl or closing fee

to Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc.

1102. Abslracl or title search
i 103. Title examination

lo

Premier Tille Insurnnce Agency Inc.

to

Premier Tille Ins urance Agency Inc.

1104. T itle ins urance binder

to Premier T it le I ns urance Ag ency Inc.

I I05. Document preparation
I I 06. Notnry fees

to Premier T itle Insurnncc Agency Inc.

11 07. Attorney's fees

to

lo Premier Title Jns urnncc Agency Inc.

S I 00.00

SI00.00

$25 .00

S25.00

{includes above items numbers:

I I08. Title insurance

to

l'rcmier T ille lusurnncc Agency Inc.

(includes above items numbers:

I I 09. Lender's coverage

S750,000.00/S I ,737.00 .

l 110. Owner's coverage

$3,500,000 .00/$7,548.00

! I l I . Escrow fee

lo

I I 12. ENDORSEME NTS l 00, I l 6,8. I

lo

1205. Courier/Messenger Fee
1206. RECONYEYANCE
1207. RECORDING

Premier T itle lns urnncc Agency Jue.

$55.00

to

Premier T itle Ins urance Agency In c.

$50.00

to

Premier T itle I nsu rance Agency luc.

lo P remier Title I ns urauee Agency inc.

SS0.00
$ 150.00

$10 0.00

1300. Additional Scfllcmcnl C h a rges

1301. Survey

lo

I 302. Pest lnspeclion

lo

1400. Total Scltlcmc11t Charges (enter 0 11 lines 103, Sccliun ,J and 502, Section K)

$64,556.73

$7,873.00

I have carefully reviewed the I IUD-I Settlcmc11i Statement a11d to lhc hes! of rny knowledge and belief, it is a true a11d accurate statement of a ll receipts and
disbur~c111cnls 11rnde 011 my account or by me in this transaction. I further certify tlwt I have received ;i completed copy o f pages I, 2 and 3 of this H UD- I Settlement
Stalcmcnl.
Equity Partners LLC

By

S ETTLEMENT AGENT CERTf!'lCATION

n,c HUD-I Settlement Statement which I have prepared is a true and accurate
1ccou11l of this transaction. I have caused the limds lo be d isbursed in
.1ccordancc willt this s tatcrnc11I.

Scttlc111c11t /\gent
Onie
\Yarning: It is a crime to knowingly make false slatcmcnts to the U11i1cd
Stales on this or nny other ~irnilar !0 1111. Pcna!tics upo:1 cc::victio;: can
include a tine and i111p1isomncnl. Fo1
details sec:
itle Howard
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Seel ionLaw Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized
byTthe
W. Hunter
100 1 and Section 10 10.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r . n ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ T .tr . . t ' f f ' ~ ~ l ? z m l l ' i i S I U ~ J : i l W ' i ~ e . ~.f ~ ~ : s l ~ ~----~ n ; : ; : :

Addendum C

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•
Operating Agreement

•

for

Tivoli Properties, LLC
A Utah Limited Liability Company

•

TI-TIS OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of August 15, 2007 by and among ..
Equity Partners, LLC and Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey, ie; Tivoli Properties LLC, a Utah LLC (the
"Company") and the persons executing this Operating Agreement as Members of the Company and all of
those who shall hereafter be admitted as Members (individually, a "Member" and collectively, the ·
"Members") whose names and signatures shall appear on "MEMBER LISTING; CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTIONS," below, hereby agree as folJows:
WITNESSETH:
1. Whereas, the Members desire lo enter into this agreement ("Operating Agreement") or
("Agreement") for the purposes of governing the Company, to and for the sole purpose of investing in,
purchasing, selling, granting, or taking an option on lands for investment purposes and/or development.
The Company shall not conduct any other business unless related to the business, unless approved by ·
unanimous consent of all Members.

2. Whereas, a limited liability company was formed in accordance with the provisions of

the Utah Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act") under the name of Tivoli Properties, LLC (the
. "Company") pursuant to a Certificate of Formation filed November 11, 2007; with the Utah Division of
Corporation. This Operating Agreement of the Company was entered into as of that same date.
3. Whereas, the Members intend to operate the Company; appoint a person or persons to. assume
responsibility for certain management matters (the "Manager") and provide for the restriction·on the ·
transfers of ownership interests in the Company ("Interests").

•

•

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual premises b~low, and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as
follows:

L DEFINITIONS
1. 1 Scope.

For purposes o f this Agreement, unless the language or context clea rly indicates that
a different meaning is intended, the following capitalized terms shall have the meanings specifi ed in th.is
Article.
1.2. De fin ed Terms.
1.2.1. "Act" means the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act and any successor
statute, as amended from time to time.
1.2.2. "Agreement" means this Operating Agreement, including any amendments,
supplements, or modi-fica tions thereto.
Page l of 20
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1.2.3. "Articles" means the articles of organization filed with the Utah Department of
Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, to organize the Company as a limited·
liability company, including any amendments.
1.2.4 "Available Funds" means-the Company's gross cash receipts from 9perations, less
the sum of: (a) payments of principal, interest, charges, and fees pertaining to the Company's
indebtedness; (bO expenditures incurred incid~nt to the usual conduct of the Company's business, .
including with out limitation the Manager compensation payments made pursuant to Article 7.9; and©)
amounts reserved to meet the reasonable needs of the Company's business in thefuture as determined by
the Manager in its sole discretion.

1.2.5 "Capital Account" of a Member means the capital account maintained for the
Member in accordance with Article II, paragraph 5.
1.2.6 "Code" means the Internal Revenue Code·of 1986, as amended.
1.2.7 "Company'' means Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company. _
1.2.8. "Loan" means the acquisition and development loan obtained by Equity Partners,
LLC from a third party lending institution to finance the acquisition and development of the Property.
· 1.2.9 "Loss" means, for any given tax year, the Company's loss for such tax year, as
determined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's method of acc_ounting.
and consisiently applied.

1.2.10. "Manager" means a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not con~isting;of
a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to manage the-Company in accordance with_
Article VII.
1.2.11. "Member" means an initial member of the Company and any Person who is
subsequently admitted as an additional or substitute member of the Company pursuant to the terms of this
Agreement.
l .2.12 "Membership Interest" or "Interest" means a Member's percentage interest in
the Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits; receive distributions, participate in the
Company's governance, approve the Company's acts, participate in the designation and removal of a
Manager, and receive information pertaining to the Company's affairs. The Membership Interests of the
initial Members are set forth in Article 3.3. Changes in Membership Interests after the date of th.is
Agreement, including those necessitated by the admission and dissociation of Members, will be reflected
in the Company's records. The allocation of Membership Interests reflected in the Company's records
from time to time is presumed to be correct for all purposes of this Agreement and the Act. Except as
expressly provided otherwise herein, with respect to the interest of a Transferee, "Interest" or
"Membership Interest" means a Transferee's percentage interest in distributions from the Company;
provided that nothing in this sentence shall be interpreted to grant to a Transferee the right to vote on or
otherwise participate in any matter as a Member hereunder other than the right to receive distributions as
set forth in Article 6.1.5.
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l .2.13. "Net Investment" means, with respect to each Member and as of any given date
of determination, the aggregate amount of cash capital contributions actually paid to and received by the
Company from such Member less all amounts of Available Funds distributed to such Member by the
Company with respect to such Member's Membership Interest.
1.2.14. "Person" means any individual, associatio~ cooperative, corporation, trust,
partnership, joint venture, limited liability company, or other legal entity.
ti)

1.2.15. "Profit" means, with respect to any given tax year, the Company's income for
such tax year, as detennined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's,
method of accounting and consistently applied.
l .2.16. "Purchase Agreement" means that certain Real Estate Purchase Contract,
entered into by and among Equity Partners, LLC, as buyer, and Poseys as Seller, pursuant to which Seller
has agreed to sell and Equity Partners, LLC has agreed to purchase, the Property, as such contract is
amended from time to time.
1.2.17 "Regulations" means propose~ temporary, or final regulations promulgated
under the Code by the Department of the Treasury, as amended.
1.2.18 "Seller" means, collectively, Kerry R. Posey, both individually and as a trustee of
the Kerry R. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, and Bobbie M. Posey, both individually and as trustee
of the Bobbie M. Posey Charitable Remainder Uni trust, in each case in such individual's or trustee,s
capacity as a seller under the Purchase Agreement.

1.2.19. "Property" means approximately 29 acres of real property located in Utah
County, Utah, held by Seller, Assessor Parcel Numbers 58-035-0029 and 58-035-0030, which-real
.property is the subj eel of the Purchase Agreement.
1.2.20 "Developer" means, Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company,
established to manage, improve, subdivide, develop, lease, and sell the Property and to perform all other
activities reasonably related thereto.
1.2.21 "Transfer" means, with respect to an Interest, a sale, pledge, encumbrance, lien,
assignment, subordinate, gift or any other disposition, direct or indirect, by Member, whether volW1tary,
involuntary, or by operation of law; provided, however, that the term uTransfer" shall not include a
redemption of all or part of a member's Membership Interest by the Company.
I .2.22. "Transferee" means a Person who acquires a Membership Interest by Transfer
from a Member or another Transferee and is not admitted as a Member in accordance with the Agreement.
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, a Transferee shall not have the rights of a Member set
forth in Article l .2.1 l, other than the right to receive distributions as set forth herein.
1.2.23. "Sharing Ratio" shall mean the percentage representing the ratio that the
number of Units owned by a Member bears to the aggregate number of Units owned by all of the
Members. Upon the issuance of additional Units or the transfer, repurchase or cancellation of any
outstanding Units, the Sharing Ratios of the Members shall be recalculated as of the date of such issuance,
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transfer, repurchase or cancellation. The recalculated Sharing Ratio of each Member shall be the
percentage representing the ratio that the number of Units owned by the Member bears to the aggregate
number of Units owned by all of the Members after giving effect to the issuance, transfer, repurchase or
cancellation.
l .2.24. "Unit" shall mean an equity interest in the Company. The Company shall have
two classes of Units: Class A and Class B. The two classes of Units shall be identical in all respects
except for their respective Voting Interests. The number of Units owned by each Member shall be
detennined in connection with the issuance of a membership interest in the Company in exchange for the
capital contribution made by such Member. Initially the Units shall not be represented by certificates. If
the Management Committee detennines that it is in the interest of the Company to issue certificates
representing the Units, certificates shall be issued and the Units shall be represented by such certificates. ·
The Company is authorized to issue 1,000,000,000 Class A Units and 200,000,000 Class B Units.
l .2.25 "Voting Interest" (a) With respect to the Class A Units, "Voting Interest" ·shall
mean that number of Class A Units held by a Member, and (b) with respect to the Class B Units, "Voting
Interest" shall mean that number of Class B Units held by a Member divided by I 0.

II. ORGANIZATION
2.1. Formation of the Company. The Company has been organized as a Utah Limited Liability
Company pursuant to the Act. The rights and obligations of the Members shall be as set forth in the Act
unless the Articles or this Agreem~t expressly provide otherwise, in which case the provisions of the
Articles or this Agreement shall control.
2.2. Name of the Company. The name of the Company shall be: TIVOLI PROPERTIES,
L.L.C. and all Company business shall be conducted in that name. or such other name the Members may
select from time to time and which is in compliance with applicable laws.
2.3. Registered Agent and Location of Records. The registered agent and registered office of
the Company in the State of Utah shall be the initial registered agent and registered office set forth in the
Articles or such other Person or location, as the case may be, as the Manager may designate from time to
time. The records of the Company required to be maintained by the Act shall be kept at the designated
office identified in the Articles, or at such other designated office as the Manager may designate from
time to time, consistent with the Act.
2.4. Purposes of the Company. The Company is organized for the purpose of carrying on the
business of acquiring, managing, improving, subdividing, developing, leasing and selling the Property or
any other enterprise that members may mutually agree upon.

2.5. FiscaJ year, accounting. The Company's fiscal year shall be the calendar year. the particular
accounting methods and principals to be foJlowed by the Company shall be selected by the accountant for
the Company ("Accountant") who is hereby designated as Dallas Cooke, CPA as the independent CPA
fim:1, The CPA Accountant may be changed by written Notice of the then serving Manager, consented to
in writing by at least Two (2) Members.
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2.6. Reports. The Managers shall provide reports concerning the financial condition and results
of operation of the Company and the Capital Accounts of the Members to the Members in the time,
manner, and form as the Manager determines. Such reports shall be provided at least annually as soon as
practible after the end of each calendar year and shall include a statement of each Member's share of
profits and other items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit.
2.7. Term of Existence. The company shall begin on 15th day of August, 2007, and shall
continue until dissolved by mutual consent or by a 30 day notice in writing on the part of the person or
persons desiring to withdraw to the other member or members of the company, and the member or
m~mbers desiring to withdraw shall first offer all bis right, title and interest in the company and assets
thereof to the other member or members at a valuation to be determined by three disinterested persons,
one of whom shall be named by the member or members desiring to withdraw, one by the remaining
member or members and the third by the two so chosen.

III. CAPITAL CONTRlBUTIONS
3.1 Initial Capital Contributions. The Members shall make the following initial capital
contributions to the Company, in cash, services, or property, in the following amounts:
3.1.1. Contributions from Equity Partners. Equity Partners shall contribute and
assign to the Company all of Equity Partners· right, title, and interest as buyer in, to, and under the
Purchase Agreement and the Company shall assume and shall perform all of Equity Partners obligations
as buyer thereunder. Furthermore, Equity Partners will arrange for, sign and guarantee an interim loan in
the amount of Seven Hundred-Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00) which will be used as operating
capital for the Company. Additionally, all amounts pai~ by Equity Partners pursuant to the entitlement
process, Purchase Agreement or otheiwise related to the acquisition and development of the Property,
whethe( pa.id·prior to or after the execution of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be capital contributions
made to the Company by Equity Partners. As of the date of this Agreement, the aggregate amount of such
deemed capital contribution made by Equity Partners to the Company $800,000.00. Once the Loan is
obtained, Equity Partners shall set aside and pay $10,000.00 per month to the Sellers from the operating
capital of the Company. As a result of such contribution, Equity Partners has been credited with a capital
account equal to $800,000.00, and has received 800,000 Class A Units.
3.1.2 Contribution from Kerry R. Posey. Kerry R. Posey shall contribute the carrying
costs of his subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One Hundred
Seventy-five Thousand pollars ($175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the Company
by Kerry R. Posey. As a·result of such contribution, Kerry R. Posey has been credited with a capital
account equal to $125,000.00, and has received 100,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class B Units.
3.1.3 Contribution from Bobbie M. Posey. Bobbie M .. Posey shall contribute the
carrying costs of her subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One
Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the
Company by Bobbie M. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Bobbie M. Posey has been credited with
a capital account equal to $125,000.00, and has received 100,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class B Units

3.2 Initial Commitments and Contributions. By the execution of trus Operating Agreement,
the initial Members hereby agree to make the capital contributions set forth herein. T~1e interests of the
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respective Members in the total capital of the Company (their respective "Sharing Ratios", as adjusted
from time to time to reflect changes in the Capital Accounts of the Members and the total capital in the
Company). Any additional Member (other.than an assignee of a Membership Interest who has been
admitted as a Member) on any capital contribution except as provided in this Operating Agreement.
3.3 Allocation of Membership Interest, As a result of the transactions described above, the
Members own the number and classes of Units and have capital account balances attributable to the Units
as set forth below:

Member

Class "A" Units

Class "B" Units

Capital Account Balance

Equity Partners

750,000

-0-

$750,000

Kerry R. Posey

100,000

25,000

$125,000

Bobbie M. Posey

I 00,000

25,000

$125,000

Based on the above, the initial Sharing Ratio of Equity Partners is 75%, and the initial Sharing Ratio of
Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey is 12.5% each.
I

3.4 Subsequent Capital Contributions No Member shall be obligated to make any capital

contributions to the Company other than those set forth herein, except as the Company and such Member
may agree in writing.
3.5 Failure to Contribute. If any member fails to make a capital contribution when required, ~e
Company may, in addition to the other rights and remedies the Company may have under the Act or
applicable law, take such enforcement action (including, the commencement and prosecution of court
·proceedings) against such Member as the Managers consider appropriate. Moreover, the remaining
Members may elect to contribute the amount of such required capital themselves according to their
respective Sharing Ratios. In such an event, the remaining Members shall be entitled to treat such amounts
as an extension of credit to such defaulting Member, payable upon demand, with interest accruing thereon
at the federa) midterm rate provided for under Code Sec. l 274(d), plus Two Percent (2%) until paid, all of
which shall be secured by such defaulting Member's interest in the Company, each Member who may
hereafter default, hereby granting to each Member who may hereafter grant such an extension of credit, a
security interest in such defaulting Member's interest in the Company.
3.6 Return of Capital Contributions. Except as expressly provided here~ each Member
agrees not to withdraw as a Member of the Company and no Member shall be entitled to the return of an
part of his or her capital contributions or to be paid interest in respect to either his or her Capital Account
or his or her capital contributions.
3.7 Capital Accounts of the Members. Separate Capital Accounts for each Member shall be
maintained by the Company. Each Member's Capital Account shall reflect the Member's capital
contributions and increases for the Member's share of any net income or gain of the Company. Each
Member's Capital Account shall also reflect decreases for distributions made to the Member and the
Member's share of any losses and deductions of the Company.
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3.7.1. Each Member's Capital Account may be increased by:
(i) The amount of money contributed by the Member to the Company.
(ii) The fair market value of property contributed by the Member to the Company(net of
liabilities secured by such contributed property that the Company is considered to assume
or take subject to under Code Sec ... If any property, other than cas~ is contributed to or
distributed by the Company, the adjustments to Capital accounts required by Treasury
Regulation Sec ... shall be made.
(iii) The Member's share of the increase in the tax basis of Company property, if any,
ari_sing out of the recapture of any tax credit.

V.MEMBERS
5.1 Initial Members. The initial Members of the Company are the Persons executing this
Agreement as Members as of the date first set forth above, each of which is admitted to the Company as a
Member effective contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement by such person.

5.2 Member Compensation. The members shall be paid such salaries as may be agreed upon
which will be charged as an expense of the business.
5.2.1 The salaries so paid, as provided hereof, shall not be considered as part of the
profits to which said parties shall be entitled.

5.3 Rights and duties of the Members.
5.3.1 Allocation. Each of the members shall be entitled to the net profits of the
bu.siness, as well as the losses happening in the course of the business which shall be
borne by each member. Such shall be borne in the same proportions as their respective
company ownership, unless the same shall happen through the wilful neglect or default
and not the mistake or error) of either of the members. In which case the loss so incurred
shall be made good by the member through whose neglect or default such losses shall
arise.
5.3.2. Distributions . The Managers may make distributions to the Members from time
to time. Distributions may be made only after the Managers determine in their reasonable
judgement, that the Company has sufficient cash on hand which exceeds the current and
the anticipated needs of the Company to fulfill its business purposes (including needs for
operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, reserves, and mandatory distributions, if·
any). All distributions shall be made to the Members in accordance with their Sharing
Ratios. Distributions shall be in cash or property or particularly in both, as detennined by
the Managers. No distribution shall be declared or made if, after giving it effect, the
Company would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of
business or the Company's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities
plus, the amount that would be needed if the Company were to be dissolved at the time of
the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights of other Members upon dissolution that
are superior to the rights of the Members receiving the distribution.
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5.3.3. Family Partnership Savings Provision. Notwithstanding anything in this
Operating Agreement to the contrary, should any provision of this Operating Agreement,
or any act of the parties, result in violation of the family partnership provisions of Code
Sec. 704(e) or the regulations and cases thereunder, the Managers may amend this
Agreement, or take any other actions reasonably necessary to prevent such violation> or to
correct such violation.
5.3.4. Other business In view of the fact that all the Members are engaged in other
business ventures, no member shall be bound to devote all of bis time lo the affairs of the
company but he shall devote at least a part of ~s working time to the affairs of the
company business and when the demands of the business shall warrant, he agrees to give
his entire working time to the business.
5.3.5 Conduct of the Company Any questions regarding the conduct of the Company
business shall be determined by a vote of 100% of the Managing Members of lhe
Company.
5.3.6 Business Continuation. The expulsion of any Member shall not dissolve the
Company as to other Members, and the remaining Members shall have right to. continue
the Company business by themselves or in conjunction with any other person or persons
they might select.
5.3.7 Withdrawal The Members shall have the right to retire or withdraw from the
Company, and this Agreement may be tenninated as to one or more Members and new
members may be admitted under the provisions hereinafter set forth, but neither such
retirement, withdrawal, termination, death of any Member, or admission of any new
Member shall dissolve this Company.
5.3.8 Selling of Members Interest Should one or more of the members desire to sell
his or their interest in the company or to withdraw from the company he or they shall do
so upon the following terms:
(i) He or they shall give to the remaining member or members 30 days' written
notice of such intention and shall, if the other member or members indicates
willingness to buy within such 30 days, sell to the remaining member or members
his or their interest in the company for an amount equal to the value of the interest
or interests according to standard accounting procedure: In the valuation of the
interest, market value, not book value, is to be considered; nor is goodwill to be
considered as an asset.

(ii) The selling member or members shall accept payment for his or their interest
in cash to be paid within 45 days from the giving of a notice of acceptance by the
remaining member or members.
(iii) The option to purchase may be exercised by the remain_ing members, if more
than one, in equal proportion, or, if one of them fails to exercise his option and
the others do not fail to do so, the latter shall have the right to purchase the whole
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of the selling members or members' interest. The selling member or members
shall not be required to sell unless their entire interest in purchased.
(iv) Should there be any disagreement by the members as to the value of the
'interest of the selling member or members, the selling member or members shall
appoint an arbitrator and the buying member or membe~s shall appoint another
and if these two arbitrators are unable to agree, the two shall appoint a third
arbitrator, and the value of selling member's or members' interest fixed by said
arbitrators or any two of them shall detennine the purchase price. All parties
agree. to be bound by such decision of the arbitrators.
5.4. Manner of Acting Among Members
5.4.1. No Member shall, without consent in writing of the other Members, do any of the
following:
(i). Assign his share or interest in the Company.
(ii) Except by will, no Member shall sell, pledge or in any way encumber his or her
interest in the Company without written consent of all other Members.
(iii) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member, draw, accept, or sign any
bill of exchange or promissory note, or contract any debt on account of the Company, or
employ any of the money or effects thereof, or in any manner pledge the credit thereof,
except in the usual an regular course of business. Any infraction of this provision shall be
a ground for an immediate dissolution of the Company as regards that· Member so
offending, and the other Members may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a written
notice to the offending Member, or left for him at the office of the Company.
(iv) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member., compound, release, or
discharge any debt which shall be due or owing to the Company, without receiving the
full amount thereof. Any infraction of this provision shall be a ground for an immediate
dissolution of the Company as regards that Member so offending, and the other Members
may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a written notice to the offending Member, or
left for him at the office of the Company.
(v) Lend any money, or give credit to, or have dealings on behalf of the. Company, with
any person, company, or corporation whom the other Members or Member shall have
forbidden him to trust or deal with; and if he shall act contrary to this provision he shall
repay to the Company any loss which may have been incurred thereby.
(vi) Hire or dismiss, except in case of gross misconduct, any clerk or other person in the
employment of the Company, without the consent of all the other Members.
(vii) Give their signature separately or collectively on behalf of the company or any
Member thereof, except for legitimate business purposes and with lhe consent of 100% of
the other Members of the Company.
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(viii) Without the previous consent in writing of all the other Members, enter into any
bond, or become bail, surety, or security, for any person.
(ix) Buy, order, or contract for any article exceeding the:value of $500~00 dollars> without
the previous ·consent in writing of all the other Members; and in case he or she does so,
·. the other Memoers shall have the option to take· ilie_goods' or· articles so bought, ordered,
or contracte~ for, on behalf of the Company, orto leave the same for the separate use of
the Meinber so buying, ordering, or ·contracting, to be paid for out of his or her own
.money.
(x) Have the right to embark in any speculative transactions involving the Company
without the consent of all the other Members.

(xi) Divulge to any person not a Member of the Company any trade secret connected with
the Company business that shall come to his or her knowledge by reason of his or her
being ·a Member, during the continuance of this Company and for five (5) y_ears after its
termination.
(xii) With the approval of all the other Members and consent of the all Members, any
Member shall be entitled to purchase any goods carried by the Company at actual invoice
price, plus the freight.
5.4.2 Meetings. An annual meeting of Members for the transaction of such business as
may properly come before the Meeting, shall be held at such place, on such date and at
such time as the Managers shall determine. Special meetings of Members for any proper
purpose or purposes may be called at any time by the Managers or the-holders of at least
Ten Percent(! 0%) of the Sharing Ratios of all Members. The Company-shall deliver or
mail written Notice stating the date, time , place, and purposes of any meeting to each
Member entitled to vote at the meeting. Such Notice shall be given not.less than Ten{l0)
and no more than Sixty(60) days before the date of the meeting. All meetings of Members
shall be presided over by a Chairperson who shall be a Manager. A Member may
participate and vote at such meeting via phone conference call.
5.4.3. Consent. Any action required or pennitted to be taken at an annual or special
meeting of the Members may be taken without a meeting, without prior Notice, and
without a vote, if consents in writing, setting forth the action so taken, are signed by the
Members having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to
authorize or take action were present and voted. Every written consent shall bear the date
and signature of each Member who signs the consent. Prompt Notice of the taking of
action without a meeting by less than unanimous written consent shall be given to all
Members who have not consented in writing to such action.
5.4.4 Voting Rights. Each member shall have a number of votes equal to such
Member,s Membership Interest in the Company.
5.4.4.1 Required Vote. Except with respect to matters for which a greater
minimwn vote is required by the Act or this Agreement, the vote of Members
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whose aggregate Membership Interest exceeds 50% of the aggregate Membership Interest
of all Members present binds the Company.

VI. TERMli'lATION OR DISSOLUTION
6.1 Accounting. Upon the dissolution of the Company a full and general account of the
assets, liabilities, and transactions of the Company shall be taken, and the assets and.property
thereof shall, as soon as practicable, be sold, the debts due the Company collected, the proceeds
applied, first, in discharge of the liabilities of the company and the expenses of liquidating the
same; and next in payment to each Member or hls or her representatives of any unpaid interest or
profits belonging to him or her, and of his or her share of the capital; and the surplus, if any, shall
be divided between the Members or their representatives in equal shares; and the Members or
their representatives shall execute all such instruments for facilitating the collection and division
of the Company, and for their mutual indemnity and release, as may be requisite or proper.
6.2 Distrib_ution. The Members agree that the determination of the amount .to be paid·
to either Member shall be determined by the auditor or certified public accountant then
employed by the company, and such computation shall be final and conclusive upon them.
6.3. Goodwill On the tennination or dissolution of the Company or the death or
retirement therefrom of a Member, neither the goodwill of the Company nor the right to the use of
the firm name shall be considered as an asset of the Company, nor shall any value be placed
thereon for the purpose of accounting or distribution.
6.4 · Death of Member Upon the death of any Member, the Company shall immediately
cease as to him or her, but shall continue as to the survivors in accordance with the terms and
conditions hereinafter set forth.
(i). Upon the death of any Member, the surviving Members shall have the right to
purchase the interest of the deceased Member at the appraised value reached by appraisers
selected as herein stated.
(ii) If the surviving Members do not desire to purchase the interest of the deceased
Member, they shall have the right to continue to operate the Company business so long as
it shows a profit; and accurate records shall be kept and frequent audits made to ascertain
whether a profit is being made for a tem1 of one year. In this event the profits of the
deceased Member shall be paid to his or her legal representative or representatives in
semiannual installments.

(iii) After the term of one year without the surviving Members purchase of the interest of
the deceased Member, an account and statement shall be taken and made out of his or her
share of the capital and effects of the Company, and of all unpaid interest and profits
belonging to him or her up to the time of his decease plus the year extension, for which
purpose a valuation shall be made of any assets or effects requiring valuation, and the
amount so ascertained to be due and owing to the deceased Member shall be paid by the
surviving Members to his or her representatives within three (3) calendar months from the
date of the one year extension from his or her decease, with interest thereon until payment
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at the rate of IO percent per annum (10%); and on such payment lhe share of the deceased
Member in the Company property and effects shall go and belong to the surviving
Members in the proportions in wmch they shall have contributed to the purchase thereof.
(iv) In case of the death of a Member and of the purchase of his or her interest by the
remaining Members as herein provided, the right to use the name of the Company and to
carry on the business under such name shall, so far as the deceased Member is concerned,
be the property of the remaining Members.
(v) In the event the remaining Members do not perform under the terms set forth above in
respect to the purchase of the deceased portion of the Company, the Company's business
shall be wound up and liquidated in 30 days from the fore-named time limit and divided
as· herein provided.
6.5 Bankruptcy or insolvency of a Member. If any member shall be adjudicated banlaupt, or
insolvent, or take proceedings for liquidation by arrangement or composition with it, ms or her creditors,
the Company shall thereupon terminate as to it, him, or her and it, he, she, or its,
or her executors,
administrators or assigns, as the case may be, shall have no interest in common with the surviving or other
Members or Member in the property of the Company, but shall be considered in equity as a vendor to the
surviving Members or Member for the share in the company of the banlaupt or liquidating or
compounding Member as and from the date of its, his or her bankruptcy, or.insolvency, or of its, his or her
having compounded as aforesaid, for the price and on the terms to be arrived at under the provisions
hereinbefore contained.

ms

6.5.1 This Agreement is expressly not intended for the benefit of any creditor of the
Company, the Manager, the Meinbers, or any-other Person. ·Except and·only to the extent
provided by applicable statute, no such creditor or third party shall have any rights under
this Agreement. No third person shall under any circumstances have any right to compel
any actions or payments by the Company, any Manager, or any Member.

t:;:,

Ql!/1

Vil. BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
7.1 Business of the Company. (a) Equity Partners, LLC ("EP") shall havefull, exclusive and
complete authority and discretion in the management and control of the business of the Company for the
purposes herein stated and shall make all decisions affecting the business of the Compa~y. At such, any
action taken shall constitute the act of, and serve to bind, the Company. EP shall manage and control the
affairs of the Company to the best of its ability and shall use its best efforts to carry out the business of the
Company and will be compensated for providing various services.
(b) The expenses so paid, as provided hereof, sha11 not be considered as part of the
profits to which any of the parties shall be entitled.
(c) All the members of the company shall fix the wages or salaries to be paid to any of
the members of the company, and shall be binding upon all.
( d) The Company has retained Four Winds Development Group, LLC ("Four Winds'') as
their representative to obtain all necessary governmental permits, approvals and
entitlements which are required to allow the improvement, development, construction and
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sale of the real estate property. Such expenses are considered expenses of the Company
and shall be paid by Four Winds and shall be reimbursed by the Company.
: (e) · The Company shall indemnify, save harmless, and pay all expenses, costs, or
liabilities of any Member who for the benefit of the Company makes any deposit, acquires
any option, or makes any other similar payment or assum~s:any obligation in connection
with any property proposed to be acquired by the Corripany;wh.ich action shall have been
consented to by the Company, and who suffers any financial loss as the result of such
action.
7.2 Change of Managers The Members from time to time.may change the number of Managers
upon the affinnative vote or written consent of Members holding an aggregate of not less than.100% of
the outstanding Membership Interest.

7.3 Election of Managers Managers shall be elected at a meeting of the Members in the case
of a Manager vacancy. If more than one Manager is to be elected, all management positions shall be filled
in the same election, i.e.; the candidate with the highest vote total will fill the first available position, the
candidate with the next highest vote total will fill the next available position, and so forth. In voting for
Managers, each Member shall have the number of votes equal to his, her or its Membership Interest.
Members may cast all of their votes for one candidate, or divide their votes among multiple candidates.
7.4. General Powers of Managers. Except as may otherwise be provided in this Operating
Agreement, the ordinary and usual decisions concerning the business and affairs of the Company, shall be
made by the Managers. The managers have the power, on behalf of the Company, to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out the business and affairs of the Company, including, the power to:

7.4. l Purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire any real orpersonal property;
Sell, convey, mortgage, grant a security interest in, pledge, lease, exchange, or otherwise
dispose or encumber any real or personal property;

, VB

7.4.2 Open one or more depository accounts and make deposits into, and write checks
and withdrawals against such accounts;
7.4.3 Borrow money, incur liabilities, and other obligations;
7.4.4 Enter into any and all agreements and execute any and all contracts, documents, and
instruments relating to the Business;
7.4.5 Engage consultants and agents, define their respective duties and establish their
compensation or remuneration;
7.4.6 Obtain insurance covering the Business and affairs of the Company's name;
7.4. 7 Participate with others in partnerships, joint ventures, and other associations and
strategic alliances only where same are directly in pursuit of the Business, as defined
above.
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7.4.7.1 There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the
powers granted the Managers herein, the Company is intended to purchase and
develop, hold and sale real estate for investment purposes only, and no activities
inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken.
7.5. Limitations. Notwithstanding the foregoing and any other provision contained in this
Operating Agreement to the contrary, no act shall be taken, sum expended, decision made, obligation
incurred or power exercised by any Manager on behalf of the Company except by the consent of Orie
Hundred percent (100%) of all Membership Interests with respect to:
7.5.1 Any significant and material purchase, receipt, lease, exchange, or other acquisition
of any real or personal property or business;
7 .5 .2 The sale of all or substantia1ly all of the assets and property of the Company;
7.5.3 Any mortgage, grant of security interest, pledge, or encumbrance upon all or
substantially all of the assets and property of the Company;
7.5.4 Any merger;
7.5.5 Any amendment or restatement of the Articles or of this Operating Agreement;
7.5.6 Any matter which could result in a change in the amount or character of the
Company's capital;
7 .5. 7 Any change in the character of the business and affairs of the Company;
7.5.8 The commission of any act which would make it impossible for the Company to
carry on its ordinary buslness and affairs;
7.5.9 Any act that would contravene any provision of the Articles or of this Operating
agreement or the Act.
7.6. Standard of Care. Every Manager shall discharge his or her duties as a Manager in good
faith, with care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances,
and in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the Company. A manager shall
not be liable for any monetary damages to the Company for any breach of such duties except for a receipt
of a fmancial benefit to wruch the Manager is not entitled; voting for or assenting to a distribution to
Members in violation of this Operating Agreement.
7.7 Tenure of Managers. Each Manager shall serve for an indefinite period, except that: (a) a
Manager may resign at any time by giving written notice to the Members at least 30 days prior to the
effective date of the resignation; (b) a Manager who is a natural personal shall cease to be a Manager upon
his or her death or at such time as he or she is adjudicated incompetent; (c) a Manager who is a legal
entity other than a natural person shall cease to be a Manager upon its dissolution or upon a change in the
controlling ownership of such Person; ( d) a Manager shal1 cease to be a Manager at such time as he or she
files , or fails to successfully contest, a petition seeking liquidation, reorganization, arrangement,
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readjustment, protection, relief, or composition in any state or federal bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, or receivership proceeding; and ( e) if a court of competentjurisdiction removes a Manager
for cause, such Manager shall cease to be a Manager upon the date of such order.
7.8. Managers Need Not be Members.

A Manager need not also be a Member.

7.9. Informal Action. Any action required or pennitted to be taken by the Manager may be taken
without a meeting if the action is evidenced by a written record describing the action taken, signed by the
Manager.

VIII. EXCVLPATION OF LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION
8.1. Exculpation of Liability. Unless otherwise provide by law·or expressly assumed, a
person who is a Member or Manager, or both, shall not be liable for the acts, debts or liabilities of the·
Company.
8.2. Indemnification. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the Company shall indemnify
any Manager and may indemnify any employee or agent of the Company who was or i~ a party or is
threatened to be made a party to a threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative, and whether formal or infonnal, other than an action by or
in the right of the Company, by reason of the fact that such person is or was a Manager, employee or agent
of the Company against expenses, including attorney's fees, judgements, penalties, fines, and amOlmts
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit or
proceeding, if the person acted in good faith, with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a manner that such person -reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the Company and with respect ~o a criminal actfon or proceeding, if such person had
no reasonable cause to believe such person's conduct was unlawful.
8 .2 .1 . To the extent that a Member, employee, or agent of the Company- has been
successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of an action, suit, or proceeding or in the
defense of any claim, issue, or other matter in the action, suit, or proceeding, such person
shall be indemnified against actual and reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit, or proceeding and .any action,
suit or proceeding brought to enforce the mandatory indemnification provided herein. Any
indemnification pennitted under this Article, unless ordered by a court, shall be made by
the Company only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that the
indemnification is proper under the circwnstances because the person to be indemnified
has met the applicable standard of conduct and upon an evaluation shall be made by a
majority vote of the Members who are not parties or threatened to be made parties to the
action, suit, or proceeding. NotwithstaJ?ding the forgoing to the contrary, no
indemnification shall be provided to any Manager, employee, agent of the Company for or
in connection with the receipt of a financial benefit to which such person is not entitled,
voting for or assenting to a distribution to Members in violation of this Operating
Agreement or the Act, or a knowing violation of law.

8.3 Insurance. The Company shall maintain for the protection of the Company and all of its
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Members such insurance as the Management Committee, in.its sole discretion, deems necessary for the
operations being conducted.

IX. AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD PARTIES AND \VITH AFFILIATES OF THE
COMPANY
9.1. Validity of Transactions. Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement maybe engaged to
perform services for the Company. The validity of any transaction, agreement or payment involving the
Company and any Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement otherwise pemritted by the terms of this
Agreement shall not be affected by reason of the relationship between them and such Affiliates or the
approval of said transactions, agreement or payment.
9.2. Other Activities Any Member and the Managers may engage in other business ventures of
every nature, including, without limitation by specification, the ownership of another business simi1arto
that operated by the Company. Neither the Company nor any of the other Members shall have.any right or
interest in any such independent venture or to the income and profits derived therefrom.
X. BOOKS, RECORDS, REPORTS, AND BANK ACCOUNTS.
10.1 There shall be kept at all times, during the continuance of the company, full and correct
books of account wherein each of the members shalJ enter all moneys by them or either of them received,
paid, laid out, or expended in and about the business, as well as all goods, wares, commodities, and
merchandise by them or either of them bought or sold, by reason or on account of the business and the
management thereof in any wise belonging. The books shall be used in common among the members, so
that any of them may have access thereto without an interruption or hindrance of the others.

I 0.1.1 The company shall operate on the basis of a calendar year. On the last day of each
year, a general account shall be taken of the assets and liabilities of the company and .of
all dealings and transactions of the same during the then preceding calendar year or
portion thereof.
I 0.1.2 The bankers of the firm shall be Zion's I si National Bank or such other bankers as
shall from time to time be agreed upon by the members, and all money and credits not
required for current expenses shall be deposited with the bank, and all checks, drafts, bills
of exchange, promissory notes or the like drawn thereon shall be signed one member and
countersigned by another, and shall be of no effect unless so signed and countersigned.
All indorsement of commercial paper by the company shall be by the company stamp or
name affixed by any member, and the same shall be signed by two members; and shall be
of no effect unless so made. If any member shall give such obligation, except in the case
aforesaid, the same shall be deemed to be given on his separate account and shall be
payable out of his separate estate, and he sha!J indemnify the other member or members
against the payment thereof.
10. 2 Schedule K-1. On or before the 90111 day following the end of each fiscal year of the
Company's existence, the Company shall cause each Member to be furnished with a federal (and where
applicable state) income tax reporting Schedule K-1 or its equivalent.
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10.3 "Tax Matters Partner." The Members shall designate a Member to the "Tax Matters
Partner>) of the Company pursuant to Section 6231 (a)(7) of the Code. The Member so designated is
authorized to take such actions as are pennittcd by Sections 6221 through 6233 of the Code. The initial
Tax Matters Partner shall be James Didericksen, in his capacity as a Member of Equity Partners. The Tax
Matters Partner may be removed by the Members at any time with or without cause. The Tax Matters
Partner will inform the Members of all administrative and judicial proceedings pertaining to the
· determination of the Company's tax items and will provide the Members with copies of all notices
received from the Internal Revenue Service regarding the commencement of a Company-level audit or a
proposed adjustment of any of the Company's tax items. The Company will reimburse the Tax Matters
Partner for reasonable expenses properly incurred while acting within the scope of the Tax Matters
Partner's authority, including, but not limited to, legal and accounting fees, claims, liabilities, losses, and
damages. The payment of such expenses shall be made as an expense of the Company and before any
distributions are made to Members. The provisions related to limitation of liability and indemnification of
the Managers set forth in this Agreement shall be fully applicable to the Member acting as the Tax
Matters Partner for the Company.
Xl. DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP

~

11.1. Dissolution. The Company shall dissolve and its affairs shall be wound up on the first to
occur of the following events:
(i) At any time specified in the Articles or this Operating Agreement;
(ii) Upon the happening of any event specified in the Articles or this Operating
Agreement;.
(iii) By the unanimous consent of all Members;
(iv) Upon the death, withdrawl, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a Member or the
occurrence of any other event that terminates the continued memberships of a Member in
the Company unless within Ninety (90) days after the disassociation of membership, a
majority in interest of the remaining Members consent to continue the business of the
Company and to the admission of one or more Members as necessary.
11.2. Winding Up. Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease carrying on its business and
affairs and shall commence the winding up of the Company's business and affairs and complete the
winding up as soon as practical. Upon the winding up of the Company, the assets of the Company shall be
distributed first to creditors to the extent permitted by law, in satisfaction of Company debts, liabilities,
obligations ant then to Members and fonner Members first, in satisfaction of liabilities for distributions
and then, in accordance with their Sharing Ratios. Such proceeds shall be paid to such Members within
One Hundred Twenty( 120) days after the date of winding up.

Xll. GENERAL PROV1SIONS
12.1 Formation of Company The Company was formed as a new venture for the purpose of
acquiring real property for development. There can be no assurance that the real property acquired by the
Company will be able to be developed and sold at a profit. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that
the application of the capital contributions required hereunder and the proceeds of the Loan (if obtained
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by Equity Partners) will be sufficient to cover the acquisition, development, and carry costs of the real
property acquired and held by the Company.
12.2. Disposition of Membership Interests Every sale, assignment, transfer, exchange,
mortgage, pledge, grant, hypothecation or other disposition of any Membership Interest shall be made
only upon compliance with this Article. No Membership Interest shall be disposed of if the disposition
would cause a termination of the Company under Sec 708 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended; without compliance with any and all state and federal securities laws and regulations; and
unless the assignee of the Membership Interests provides the Company with the information and
agreements that the Managers may require in connection with such disposition, including but not limited
to an executed counterpart of this Agreement.
12.2.1 No Member shall be entitled to assign, convey, sell, encumber, or in any way
alienate all or any part of its Membership Interest in the Company and as a Member
except with the prior written consent of a majority in the interest of the non-transferring
Members, which consent may be given or witlilield, conditioned, or delayed (as allowed
by this Agreement or the Act), as the non-transferring Members may detennine in their
sole discretion. Transfers in violation of this provision shall only be effective to the extent
of an assignment of such interest with only rights set forth in the following provi_sion
"Pennitted Dispositions".

12.3 Permitted Dispositions. Subject to the provisions of this Article, a Member may assign
such Member's Membership Interest in the Company in whole or part. The assignment of a Membership
Interest does not in itself entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the Company
or to become a Member. Such assignee is only entitled to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions
the assigning ~ember would otherwise be entitled to, and such assignee shall only become a assignee of a
Membership Interest and not a substitute Member.
12.4 Acknowledgment of Access to Records. Each Member acknowledges that such Member
has been furnished and has reviewed the Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement of the
Company and al amendments, if any, to those documents.· Each Member further acknowledges that all
instruments, documents, records, books, and financial information pertaining to this investment have been
made available for inspection by such Member and it professional advisors and that the books and records
of the Company will be available upon reasonable notice for inspection by such Member during
reasonable business hours at the Company's principal place of business.
12.5 Required Amendments. The Members and Managers will execute and file any
amendments to the Articles required by the Act. If any such amendments results in inconsistencies
between the Articles and this Agreement, this Agreement will be considered to have been amended in the
manner necessary to eliminate the inconsistencies.

12.6 Policies. In every instance where agreement between the members does not exist with
reference to the policies to be followed by the company; the managing members shall have the right to
decide what policy or policies shall be followed and the other member or members shall consider the
decision as final.
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12.7 Additional Instruments. Each Member will execute and deliver any document or statement
necessary to give effect to the tem1S of this Agreement or lo comply with any law, rule, or regulation
governing the Company's fonnation and activities.
12.8 Power of Attornev. Each Member appoints each Member, with full power of substitution,
as the Member's attorney-in-fact, to act in the Member's name and to execute and file (a) all certificates,
applications, reports, and other instruments necessary to qualify or maintain the Company as a limited
liability company in the states and ·foreign countries where the Company conducts its activities, (bO all
~lruments that effect or confirm changes or modifications of the Company or its status, including,
without limitation, amendments to the Articles, and ©) all instruments of transfer necessary to effect the
Company's dissolution and termination. The power of attorney ·granted by this article is irrevocable,
coupled with an interest, will survive any incapacity of the Member, and shall be binding upon the
Member's successors and assigns.
12.9 Disputes. In the event that any dispute should arise concerning any of the terms, covenants
or conditions of this agreement, or with respect the enforcement thereof, or with respect to any dissolution
or liquidation of the Company, or with respect to any matter affecting the opera'tion and conduct of the
business of the Company, such dispute shall be disposed by arbitration by submitting the same to two
indifferent, competent persons in or well acquainted with the trade or business of the company, one to be
chosen by either party, or by an wnpire to be chosen by the referees in the usual course in such or similar
cases; and their or his decision shall, in all respects, be final and conclusive on both parties, and shall be
given, in writing, within l O days next after such submission, or within such further time, not exceeding 30
days, as they or he shall require.
·

12.10 Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding and agreement
among the parties concerning the Company and supersedes any and all prior negotiations, understandings
or agreements in regard thereto.
12.11. Amendment. This Agreement may not be amended nor may any rights hereunder be
waived except by an instrument in writing signed by Members having a Sharing Ratio of more than 50%
in the aggregate.

12.12 Pronouns. References to a Member, including by use of a pronoun, shall be deemed to
include masculine, feminine, singular, plural, individuals, partnerships, corporations or other legal entities
where applicable.

~

.~

12.13 Scverability. If any provision of this Agreement or the application of such provision to
any Person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Agreement, or the application of
such provision to Persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be
affected .
12.14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement,

excluding any conflict of laws rules.
12.15 Counterparts. This instmment may be executed in any number of counterparts each of
which shall be considered an original.
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12.14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement,
excluding any conflict of Jaws rules.
·J2.15 Counterparts. This instrument may be executed in any number of counterpans each of
which shall be considered an original.
·

12.16. Parties and Successors Bound. This agreement shall be binding upon Lhe heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns of the parties hereto and constitutes the entire agreement of the
parties hereto, and may not .be amended by the parties except in writing signed by the majority of the
parties.

12.17. Article Headings. The Article headings and numbers contained in this Operating
Agreement have been inserted only as a matted of convenience and for reference, and in no way shall be
construed to define, limit, or describe the scope otr intent of any provision of this Operating Agreement.
12.18. Amendment. This Operating Agreement may be amended or revoked at any time by a
written agreement executed by all of the parties to this Operating Agreement, except where a lesser·
percentage of Membership Interests is pennitted elsewhere in this Operating Agreement. No change or
modification to this Operating Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by all of the parties
to this Operating Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands and seals the date and year
first above written.
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC

8--/f--O?
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SETTLEMENT AGREE1\.1ENT AND RELEASE

'

EXHIBIT

~--

TiilS SEITLEht!ENT AGREE1v.lENT AND RELEASE ("Settlement Agreement") is made and
entered into by and among Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey, individuals (the "Poseys"); Equity Partners,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and Four Winds Dev~1opment Group, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, as the sole member and manager of'Equity Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as

''Equity Partners"); Four Winds Development Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company:r James
Didericksen,. as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group:r LLC,
Allan Bruun, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC,
and Guy Anderson, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Wmds Development Group,
LLC ( collectively referred to as "Foor Winds"); and Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, Equity Partners, LLC, as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Kerry Posey, as a member of
Tivoli Properties, LLC, Bobbie Posey as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, and Vladamir Canro, as
an individual and as the manager of Tivoli Properties, LLC (collectively referred to as "Tivolf1; and
collectively referred to as the "Parties."

RECITALS
WHEREAS, up to the fall of2007, the Poseys owned approximately thirty acres of real property
located at 7916 North 10800 West, Saratoga Springs, Utah, 84045, and more particularly described in
the legal descriptions attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "Property"); and
WHEREAS, as members of a newly created Utah limited liability company {Tivoli Properties,
LLC), the Poseys and Equity Partners entered into an agreement to develop the Property for the
anticipated mutual benefit of the Poseys and Equity Partners; and

WHEREAS, at a real estate closing held on or about November 16, 2007, in exchange for a cash
payment and the agreement of Equity Partners to provide the Poseys with a third lien position in the
Property, the Poseys conveyed title to the Property to Equity Partners, LLC; and
WHEREAS:. due to declining real estate and financial markets, and also due to growing distrust,
dissatisfaction and disappointment between the Parties, the Parties have chosen now to part ways, and
by this Settlement Agreement have arrived at what each believes to be an agreeable resolution and
settlement of all claims, disputes and defenses the Parties have or may have with respect to each other.
NOW TIIEREFORE, in order to memorialize their resolution and settlement, the Parties hereby
enter into this following Settlement Agreement upon the following terms:

TERMS

l. Settlement Payment: Equity Partners shall receive a lump sum Settlement Payment in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand dollars ($25,000.00). The Settlement Payment shall be made as a
transfer from Premier Title Company's escrow account to an account, or accounts, designated by Equity
Partners within forty-eight hours after the execution of this Settlement Agreement.
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2. Transfer of Property: Equity Partners shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in favor oftbe Poseys,
as Grantees, for the Property. The Quit Claim Deed descnoed in this paragraph has been approved by
the Poseys, and is currently being held by Premier Title Company. The Quit Claim Deed will be
recorded by Premier Title Company within forty eight-hours after the execution of this Settlement
Agreement.
3. Release of Claims and Liability: The Parties mutually release, cancel, forgive and forever
discharge each other, and each of their predecessors, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and divisions, and
all of their officers, members, directors and employees from all actions, claims, demands, damages,
obligations, liabilities, con1roversies and executions, of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether known
or unknown, which have arisen, or which may have arisen, or which may arise by reason of money
received, management of funds, management actions or payments made, as designated and described in
the Tivoli Properties, LLC, Operating Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Agreement associated
with the Property, as managers, buyers, sellers, consultants,.agents, employees, representatives, owners,
members, affiliates, contractors, associates, or any other affiliated operative from the first day of the
world, including this day and each day hereafter. This release of claims includes, but is not limited to,
the payments to and receipts by the persons and entities identified on the schedule of Questioned
Payments attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4. Global /Comprehensive Release: The Parties specifically waive any claim or right to assert
any cause of action or alleged case of action which has, through oversight or error, intentionally or
unintentionally, and whether by mutual or unilateral mistake, been omitted from this Settlement
Agreement

5. Ae:reement to Execute Additional Documents to Carry Out Settlement: The Parties
will execute any and all other documents as reasonably necessary to implement the terms and effecting
the purposes of this Settlement Agreement.
6. Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Each Party is responsible for his/her/its own
attorneys' fees and costs associated with resolution of the issues and transactions to which this
Settlement Agreement pertains, including but not limited to negotiating, drafting and entering into this
Settlement Agreement, and for any subsequent documents and actions necessary and appropriate for
implementing the terms and effecting the purposes of this Settlement Agreement.
7. Confidentialitv: Except as necessary to the conduct or protection of their legitimate business

interests or as may be required by operation oflaw or order of court, the Parties covenant to hold the
terms, conditions and performance of this Settlement Agreement in confidence and to refrain from
discussing their dispute or its resolution with other persons not a party to this Settlement Agreement,
except as necessary or appropriate with their legal and financial professionals.
8. No Actual or Implied Admission: This Settlement Agreement is not to be construed as an
admission or acknowledgment of any wrongdoing, fault or liability by any Party to any other Party, or to
any third person or entity not party to this Settlement Agreement; and each Party hereby expressly
denies any such wrongdoing, fault or liability.
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9. Severabilitv: If any provision of this Settlement Agreement or the application thereof
to any person, entity, or circumstance shall, for any reason and to any extent, be found invalid or
unenforceable, neither the remainder of this Settlement Agreement nor the application of such provision
to any other person, entity, or circumstance shall be affected thereby:i but rather shall be enforced to the
greatest extent possible.
10. Default and Attorneys' Fees and Costs: In the event of breach or default hereunder,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all expenses, costs, and attorneys'
fees incurred in connection with determining, protecting or enforcing their rights, including lay and
expert witness fees, whether such expenses would be recoverable as costs and attorneys' fees in the
original action or not.
11. Jurisdiction, Venue. and Governing Law: Jurisdiction and Venue shall exist only in
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah for any action in regard to this Settlement
Agreement. This Settlement Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the State of Utah.
·
12. Entire Aereement: This Settlement Agreement sets forth the entire Settlement
Agreement of the Parties in the settlement of their respective differences. No provision of this
Settlement Agreement may be amended or any right hereto modified or waived except by a written
agreement executed by the Parties.
13. Cooperation in Drafting the Settlement A!!reement: Each Party hereto has
cooperated in establishing the terms of this Settlement Agreement as well as drafting the recitals and
terms of this Settlement Agreement. Therefore, if any construction or interpretation is to be made
regarding this Settlement Agreement or any of its Recitals or Terms, the same shall not be
presumptively construed against any Party.
14. Counterparts: This Settlement Agreement may be executed in any number of
counterparts, each of which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original, and all of which when
taken together shall constitute one and the same document
15. Successors and Assigns: This Settlement Agreement is binding upon the Parties,

their heirss executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, o.nd will inure to the benefit of the
Parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns.
16. Authority to Execute This Ae:reement Each Party to this Settlement Agreement
hereby represents and warrants to each other Party that he/she/it has the authority and/or bas been duly
authorized to execute, be bound to:, and deliver this Settlement Agreement.
17. Aclmowledgement: The Parties declare that each has read and understands this Settlement
Agreement. The Parties have executed this Settlement Agreement voluntarily and without being unduly
pressured, under duress or influenced by any statement or representation made by any other Party or by
any person acting on behalf of any other Partys including their counsel. In negotiating, drafting and
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entering into this Agreement, the Parties also acknowledge that they have either been represented, or
have had an opportunity to be represented, by and/or consult with independent counsel of their own
choosing.

Dated:

t:./;t lo f3

Dated:

///11 /o 3
--~,-......__1-----

FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
A UTAH LThfiTED LIABILITY C01v.1P ANY

_,a,,,

ging Member of Four Winds
Development Group, LLC, its sole member
and manager

l~/-_o_g.,____

By:
Guy Anderson I
Its: Managing Member

/I

/4 /¢,

Dated: -~//___

Dated:

FOUR WlNDS DEVELOP:MENT GROUP, LLC
A UTAH LThflTED LIABILITY CO:MPANY

FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
A UTAH LilvfITED LIABILITY CO:MPANY

J

•

By.~~
Allan Bruun
Its: Managing Member

Dated:
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH LThIITED LIAB

COMPANY

/1

I

lr2. / 0 Y
I

TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH L™1TED LIABILITY COlv!PANY

By:~~
· gMemberofFourWinds
Development Group, LLC, the sole member
and manager of Equity Partners, LLC, its
member

Keny~osey
Its: Member

Second Signature Page of Settlement Agreement on Following Page
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Second Signature Page of Settlement Agreement

Dated: _

___._l.;;..._/-_l..:;;...;l_-_.;;;..t)_f,____ __

Dated:

//- / J. - 0

8

TIVOLIPROPERTIES,LLC

TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC

A UTAH LilYfITED LIABlLITY CO:rv.IPANY

A UTAH LIIMITED LIABil.,ITY CONIPANY

By: --,t::,...::::.....=..-=--.:::~.:::;_____i~~~-::+---Bobbie Posey

By: .,.
Vladaniir Canro
Its: Manager

Its: Member

Dated:

//-/:)-1) <j

By.~
Kerry Po
As an individual

Dated:

If!~

/-,Me

/3CM,ll?.JZJJJ.

//-/~-0~
Dated: ----------:..........--::~----

OO"_v IPtklf?--<L
r

By:
_Bobbie Posey
As an individual

Dated:

//--//- cB
----------

/$!/,~

By.
Allan Bruun
As an individual

Dated:

// / / / /ere
--------.,-----........_,
---------

By:~
Guy Anders
As an individual

d'~.

Dated:

(J-

}A -

fb~

By:
Vla¥mii Canro
As an individual

o ~

,0

__.GO .J) '

5
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ENT 122137:2008 PG 1 of 2
RANDALL A. COVINGTON
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER
200! Nov 14 ll~591111 FEE 14,00 BY TO
RECORDED FOR PREHIER TITtE INSURANCE AGE

When Recorded Mail to:
GR.ANTEE

7c111.o NO\'t\1 \ ()g.'OO -we~+
Q:;\r~~ct

ELECJROUICAUY REmRDED

rprm.':! c, or 'E~ 04<;
PREMIER TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY INC.
7240 S mgltlllad Dr Ste 200
Salt Laite City, UT 84121

QUIT CLAIM: DEED
Equity Partners LLC

grantor(s) of Utah. State of UT.AH. hereby QUIT CLAIM to
Keay n. Posey and Bobbie M. Posey, Tenants in Common

, gr_antee(s)

of Utah for the sum of TEN OOLl...ARS AND onmR VALUABLE
CONSIDER.ATIONS- the following described tract(s) of land in County,
State of Utah, to-wit

Parcell:

.

Comme:ndzig at ll pcmt tocated South 867.0S feet and Fast 56.12 lcet Cram tb Nmth
qnmter comer of Section 25, TownshJp 9 South, IAnp 1 West, Salt W-n Base andMcridimi;
then= Nmth 89 cfest=s BS' s2• EIISt ali:ms~;:dstinsf'cnce line 592.28 !cct; Sauth 89
~ 57'67" Ea.st ll!ong ancmtmgf=ce.~759.09 feet; thence Saath 197.62 feet;
thence South 89 dogrces 49'19'Westp!1l'liallyillc~a fcnco lino imdlcncc line c:mmfan
1145.68 lect; tbcnm Nmtb 00 d.egrcc, 05'i4• 1.ashJong l!aahfgh! alway lino of iedwood
Road 201.24 feet to paint c l ~
Tax Scda1 No.: 58-005-0029

Parcel 2:
Cammc:m:lng l!a$t a.f.im,t Section line 60.69 f.cd 11ml Sowh 867.SS l'cet fmm. the Norlh
quarterc:amcrotSectianZS, Towmhip B Soafh, ilmgc 1 Wcs,Sllltlalce BaseandM=:idfan,
thml= EastZSSS.OS met; thcm:a Sou.th 4Z degrees 411 West 867.20 f=ta 11.lcna:; thence
North 89degrces4'1' Westnlcnglll!ldtencolincZ404.SSfi:et'lo lllm\co~;fhencc
North 26' East Blong
line 481.46 fed to the begfnnfng,

mnm

and c:xchtding the following described tract of land In Utllh Ccnnty, StDte af Ultm:

Commencing at a pcfnt loaltcd South 867:0S feet East 58.12 feet from tho North quarter
anncr cf Seclim12S, Township 6 South,~ 1 West, Salt Lam BIUCl mulMmdiim; thmu:o
North 89 degrees sacsz• East alcDs an e::i:islint;!cttcelfna 59.2.28 lcet; tlumco South 89
deg,:ccs 57'5T!mt along im c:xbting fcncD Uno 763.09 fed; fhenca Sou1h 197.62 feet;
thence South 89 dcgn:cs 49'19• Wcstpartfnllylllang 11. fence tine and fence lfncem::mlon
1145.68fcd; lhcncaNmth 00 dcgr:ccs 05'141 East lllong East llJght of Wa:y linealllcdwood
RcAd 201.Z4- f'eatto pointofbcgfrmmg.

'1'llx Serial Na.: 5&-055..0050

Tax ID No.: 58-035--001.9, 58-035--0030
WITNESS the hnnd(s) of said grantor.(s), November~ 2008.
Signed in Iha Presence of

.

--

---··----·-----------------------
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This document has been recorded dectronlcally.

Please see the attaclied copy to vtew the Cowity
Recorders stamp as It now appears In lhe pnbl!c record.
[)

Date: II !J4\ 0& Entry: \'2.'2-\ ~7 : tiJt'Jg'
Submitted br,_..µje:::..~.::.!~f-=-(J_ _ _ __

When Recorded Mail to:

GRANTEE

7q I\o

NDrtn \&oo \JJe,t

~~

.q~_rfl'ltj ( I

UT it[ 04c;
PREMIER TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY L'lC.
7240 S Higbbnd Dr Ste 200
Slllt I.Ake City, UT 84lll

QUIT CLAIM DEED
Equity Partners LLC

grantor(s) of Utah, State of UTAH. hereby QUITO.AIM to
Kerry R. Posey and Bobbie M. Posey, Tenants in Common

, gr:antee(s}

of UtahforthesumofTENDOLLARSANDOTHER VALUABLE
CONSIDERATIONS- the following described tract(s) of land in County,
State of Utah, to-wit:
Pa.rccl 1:

.

Commencms at a point locited South 867.08 feet and P.ut 56.12 feet from the North
qiw:ter comer of Sedion 23, Townsbfp 9 South, imlgc 1 W=, Sdlt lal:a Base lllld Me:idimr,
lbenco Norlh 89 degrees 56' sz• E a s t ~ ~ ~ tem::o lino 592.28 feel:; Soafh 89
dcgrccs 57'5-r Ea.st along llll exfsting leztci!_!lnii '.755.09 fed; thence South 197.B2 leet;
th=sce Soufh 89 degru., 49'19" West partially along a h:zM:e lino and fence line c:m:mion
114-5.68 feet; thence North 00 dcgrcd 0&14• Eitst along Eutrigbt alway line ol R=iwcod
Bead 201..U feet lo point o f ~
T11:r S.:rial No.: 58-0SS-0029

Pllrcd2:

Cammem:ms Eut iwms Section lino 60.69 feet IIDd Scufh 867.58 fed: Crom tbe North

quarter comer of Sed!on ZS, Township 5 South, Range 1 West, Sl1lt Lake Base and Meridian,

them:e East 285S.0S feet; lhcncc South 4Z degrees 41' West 667.ZO feet to 11. Cena:; ilu:nce
North 89 degrees 47' West alOJ28 5llid fmca line Z40.U5 feet lo ll feztee inlasc:dion; !hence

North 2B East along fi:na: line ,&SJ .46 led ID the bcginnm&

and c:u:buling the following described tnct of hmd In utnh County, Slnfe of Utnh:
Commencing ot a point Jocmd South 867.08 fed Eut 56.12 feet mun the North qwu-tet-

ccmer of Section 25, Township 5 South, Rlmge 1 Wea., Sall 1Akc Brue And Mmdisn; fhmcc
North 89 degrees 56'SZ- East a.Jons 11D existing fma, line S92..2a lc:ct; thence So'lllh 89
degrees 57'5r Eutlllongan msting fence line 793.09 feet; rhenccSooih t97.6Z Ced;
thence Soa!h 89 degrees 49'19" West partially along a knee line and fence line ext=mion
1145.68 leet; Uu:nc:c North 00 dcgn:es 05'14• East akmg Inst Right o!Way line of Redwood
Ro!ld 201.24 feet to point ol bezinning.
Tax: Serial No.: 58--059-00SO

Tax ID No.: 58-035-0029, 58-035-0030

Wl1NESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s), November~ 2008.
Signed in the Presence oi
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l!qufty Pllrlner:s LLC
By: Alla11 Druu11, M0D11ging Member of Four

Winds Development Group, Its Sole Membtr and
Manager

/,1 /
t-(L__
Equity Partatrs LLC
/
By: Ruin Gay Anderson, Mmu,gu,i;Mc:mber or
_-,,

'/( P,.1

J-1

:I

//411- /~,

FourWmds Development Group, Its Sole
berDJ1d
ger

ly Parblcrs LLC
y, JamesDarreDDlderiduca. Mami:m1

mber ol'Four Winds Development Gruap, Its
Sole Member 1111d MaDAger

5rATE OF UfAH,

)

County of SALT LAKE

}.ss
)

L

On November
2008, personally appeared befure me, Allan Bruun,
Reulon Guy Anderson, James J?arreD Dideric:ksen, Managing Member of Four
Winds Development Group, Its Sole Member and Manager, Equity Pn.rtnus LLC
the signer(s) of the above instrumentr who duly acknowledged to me that they
executed lheseme.

~

~

N01'ARYPtJB

C .
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EXlilBIT "A"
(Legal Description)
Parcel 1:
Commencing at a point located South 867.08 feet and East 56.12 feet from the North quarter
comer of Section 23, Township 5 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence
North 89 degrees 56' 32" East along an existing fence line 392.28 feet; South 89 degrees 57'57"
East along an existing fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees
49'19" West partially along a fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00
degrees 05'14" East along East right of way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of
beginning.
Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0029
Parcel 2:
Commencing East along Section line 60.69 feet and South 867.58 feet from the.North quarter
comer of S~ction 23, Township 5 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence
East 2853.03 feet;-thence South 42 degrees 41' West 667.20 feet to a fence; thence North 89
degrees 47' West along said fence line 2404.35 feet to a fence intersection; thence North 26' East
along fence line 481.46 feet to the beginning,

I

\~

and excluding the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah:
Commencing at apoint located South 867.08 feet East 56.12 feet from the North quarter comer of
Section 23, Township 5 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89
degrees 56'32" East along an existing fence line 392.28 feet; thence South 89 degrees 57'57" East
along an existing fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees
49'19" West partially along a fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00
degrees 05'14" East along East Right of Way line of Redwood Road 201 .24 feet to point of
beginning.
Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0030

;-·.

Tax ·serial No.: ·58-035-0029

I
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Unexplained Payments
Related Entities
Four Winds Development
Granite Builders
Geo systems

U.S. General Construction
Construction Advisors
TOTAL:

Related Persons

Guy Anderson
Jim Didericksen
Dustin Didericksen
TOTAL:

Other
Cash

Karnatsu Equipment·
Moulding & Sons
Key Banlc
DOPL
GWF Inc.
Century 21 Elite
Wasatch Trailers
TOTAL:
GRAND TOTAL

Check Number(s)
1004, 1008, 1021, 1024,
1027, 1034, 1042, 1049,
1055
1007, 1018, 1023, 1028,
1047,
1016, 1029
1019
1062, 1066

Amount
$47.500.00
$58,240.00
$7,975.00
$100,000.00
$61000.00
$219,715.00

Check Number(s)
1001
1006, 1035
1030

Amount
$1,014.38
$7,151.50
$500.00
$8,665.88

Check Number(s)
Counter Check
1012
1015
1017
1024, 1024
1098
1051
1041

Amount
$100.00
$5,300.00
$4,080.00
$300.00
$615.00
$4,000.00
$7,500.00
$42015.52
$25,910.52
$254,291.40
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